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Remarks on shaping global-
ization
Perspectives of development
cooperation and elements of
global governance
1 Globalization and new chal-
lenges for policy making
Globalization of economy, technology,
communication, and transportation systems
entails an internationalization of undesir-
able developments like crime, the drugs
trade, and unemployment. The risks posed
by new technologies can no more be con-
tained nationally than can the climate
problematique or the effects of shifts in the
exchange rates of important currencies on
"national economies," economic sectors,
individual firms, employment, and social
development. Crises in seemingly distant
regions - like immiseration and mass pov-
erty, environmental degradation and war,
poverty-related migration or human rights
violations - tend to reverberate globally.
World problems are overtaxing the nation-
state.
The incessantly growing complexity of
economic interdependencies, the increas-
ingly intricate network of trade relations,
financial flows, and direct investment are
influencing the development dynamics of
"national economies" and the options open
to national policy to an extent that would
have seemed completely inconceivable
even twenty-five years ago (prior to the
collapse, in 1973, of the Bretton Woods
system). Following the collapse of social-
ism and the failure of inward-looking
development strategies in the South, the
world economy has, in nearly all countries
of the world, become the frame of refer-
ence for national development strategies
and economic policies. The 1990s saw the
emergence of a world market economy
marked by competition not only between
firms but between systems of social wel-
fare, education, environmental regulation,
and taxation as well.
The globalization processes presently
underway imply an augmentation and in-
tensification of transboundary interactions
that are involving practically all societies,
states, organizations, groups of actors, and
individuals - albeit at different levels of
depth - in a complex system of mutual de-
pendencies. The scopes of action open to
individuals, the reach of national policy,
lifeworlds, patterns of social organization,
and the deep structures of societies are
undergoing a process of profound and en-
during change. So globalization is not at all
only an economic phenomenon. Political,
social, and ecological processes are like-
wise increasingly assuming transnational
dimensions.
Globalization is a spatial phenomenon.
Local, regional, national, and global spaces
are contracting and intermeshing in en-
tirely new ways. Projects aimed at regional
integration of country groups are moving
in to take up the space between nation-
states and the global level. Economic, so-
cial, and cultural activities are being repo-
sitioned along the continuum extending
from local to global spaces and levels of
action. Chains of action are networked ever
more closely across different levels. Local-
multilateral, inter- and i traregional, or
even transcontinental interaction patterns
are emerging between firms, governmental
institutions, nongovernmental organiza-
tions, universities, individuals. Entirely
remote events go on to affect local devel-
opments and vice versa.
4 DIRK MESSNER
Globalization has a temporal dimension.
Information, knowledge, capital, goods,
and people can be transported around the
globe at an increasingly rapid pace. Ac-
tivities, decisions - including those not
taken - in one corner of the world in this
way unfold, with an ever briefer time lag,
impacts at the other end of the earth, even
on everyday behavior.
Globalization is characterized by dense
chains of causal interdependencies bet-
ween different global trends. This can be
outlined with reference to the global
syndrome of growth - energy use - envi-
ronmental protection - unemployment -
developing countries: Globally, growth is
running up against limits, energy con-
sumption and environmental protection
tend to counteract each other, less growth
in the industrialized countries increases
unemployment, unemployment in the in-
dustrialized countries harms the export
chances of developing countries, pioneer-
ing rationalization successes in the OECD
countries diminish the chances for coun-
tries in the process of development and/or
transformation to catch up, lack of innova-
tion reduces the chances for an ecological
efficiency revolution - "... and in the long
run everything is wholly different than in
the short-term perspective" (Krupp 1997,
97). Economic and social development,
population growth, the environment, and
technological innovations affect each other
in wholly specific ways. War and peace
may depend on social developments, envi-
ronmental deformations, or lack of politi-
cal regulation of complex problems with
border-crossing impacts.
Globalization entails a great variety of
opportunities, e.g. for developing countries
which succeed in actively integrating into
the world economy. After all, the most
dynamic economies of the past three
decades have been the ones which have
deliberately and selectively moved toward
the world economy. These worldwide in-
terdependencies and reciprocal dependen-
cies can also encourage a greater measure
of cooperation in world society. And, not
least, the new information and communi-
cation technologies are permitting many
actors who have until now largely been cut
off from worldwide communication flows
to more rapidly access internationally
available knowledge and take advantage of
opportunities offered by international net-
working; this applies equally for govern-
mental institutions, firms, nongovernmen-
tal organizations, and scientists from many
countries of the South.
Globalization does, however, also pose
a number of new and complex questions
concerning the future of policy:
· Governability as a future problem: If
it is correct that the world threatens to
break free of the framework defined by
the nation-state and to "drift," as Dieter
Senghaas writes, then we are faced
with the question of whether and how
globalization can be shaped politi-
cally, and hence with the "problem of
the governability of the world," as the
matter was formulated by the Israeli
social scientist Yehzkel Dror at the be-
ginning of the 1990s in a report to the
Club of Rome.
· Organizational framework for the
world economy: The issue here is in
particular what possibilities there are to
embed the world economy in an in-
stitutional framework. It is precisely
against the background of the Asian
crisis and the turbulences in the inter-
national financial markets that interna-
tional organizations (like IMF, OECD,
BIZ, etc.), which until recently rejected
any reflections on necessary organiza-
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tional frameworks for the world econ-
omy as "old thinking," have now begun
to concern themselves with approaches
to regulating the global economy,
· Unfettered globalization overstrains
societies' mechanisms of social inte-
gration: In an article in the Germany
weekly "ZEIT" in February 1998, Ralf
Dahrendorf warns of a "wild and mer-
ciless globalization" which is subject
only to the laws of competition and
may thus, in many countries, lead to
the exclusion of "a substantial number
of people" from society. This, however,
would mean, Dahrendorf goes on, "that
such a society can no longer convinc-
ingly demand that its members respect
law and order" - the consequence of
which would be increasing domestic
social strife and jeopardization of so-
cial cohesion. If we take seriously this
warning of an observer not known as
one of the prophets of doom in his
field, we are faced with the question of
the primacy of politics vis-à-vis the
self-dynamic laws of the market as
well as of institutions adequate to the
task of shaping the process of glob-
alization and approaches needed to
prepare national societies and institu-
tional systems in North, South, and
East for the new challenges ahead.
Overview:
Globalization problems - problem types
1. Global goods (and bads)
- protection of the international climate
- protection of biodiversity
- protection ofthe ozone layer
- stability of the international financial
system, etc.
2. Transboundary problems
- migration
- pollution of the North Sea
- acid rain
- corruption, etc.
3. Global phenomena
- megacities
- crisis of hierarchical large-scale organi-
zations
- employment crises, etc.
4. Global interdependency problems
- economic crises - immiseration - mi-
gration
- world trade - transportation - ecological
costs of mobility
- declining incomes in industrialized
countries - declining energy consump-
tion - employment problems in North
and South, etc.
5. Competition between systems (loca-
tional competition), races to the bot-
tom
- tax-reduction races
- (cost) competition between systems of
social and environmental regulation
- social disintegration, etc.
6. Complexity of global governance
architecture
- deficits in democracy and legitimation
- coordination problems of multilevel
policy
- risk of negotiation blockades
- blockades due to asymmetrical power
structures, etc.
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At the World Economic Forum held at
the beginning of 1998 in Davos many dis-
cussions centered on the question of the
future of policy making in a globalized
world. What is at issue here is not the old
dispute over more or less government or
demand-side versus supply side policy.
The case is instead such that our societies
operate with institutions that are no longer
a match for the new realities of globaliza-
tion and the information revolution. This is
the source of the alleged powerlessness of
policy. If politics is to regain the initiative
and put an end to the growing tendency
toward policy failure, it will have to adapt
its instruments and institutions. Richard
Haas, one of the most distinguished re-
searchers at the Washington Br okings
Institute, sees, against this background,
creation of institutions to deal with glob-
alization as the currently "greatest intel-
lectual challenge facing the world."
Globalization is a complex phenome-
non, and it is giving rise to a great variety
of problem areas that call for differentiated
responses. Six problem types can be dis-
tinguished (Messner 1998, p. 30-38):
2 Causes of the "policy crisis"
The "policy crisis" is the fault not of glob-
alization per se but of the organization of
policy. World economy and society have
changed emphatically in the past two dec-
ades, policy institutions have not kept
pace; their inertia is (too) strong; they are
marked by a lack of institutional and po-
litical innovations. World society is in this
sense "underregulated," institutionally un-
der-, not to say, maldeveloped:
1. We are experiencing on the one hand
an increase in the gulf between the inter-
nationalized economy, global environ-
mental hazards, transboundary prob-
lems (such as migration, crime, deforesta-
ion, loss of biodiversity) and on the other
hand a large measure of fixation on terri-
orial sovereignty when political action is
called for. Constitutive coordinates of our
political thinking are being challenged, or
indeed outstripped, by today's realities:
- While political institutions geared to
internal or external policy are clearly
separate from one another, each being
the domain of a specific policy com-
munity, the boundaries between do-
mestic and foreign policy are de facto
blurred, because current problems in-
creasingly have a tr nsboundary, in-
deed not infrequently global, character:
the problems of races to lower taxes in
connection with locational competition
and the problem of taxing capital in-
come (involving, in many countries, a
shrinking tax base) with an eye to lib-
eralizing international financial markets
have an immediate impact on national
fiscal policy, domestic social relations,
and, at the same time, on relations with
other societies; local and national envi-
ronmental problems often have trans-
boundary impacts or external causes;
issues concerning domestic social bal-
ance and social security standards are
interwoven with conflicts of interest
stemming e.g. from disparities in inter-
national development (keywords: social
and ecological dumping in world
trade). In view of these trends the sepa-
ration of policy into domestic and for-
eign affairs often still dominant in the
literature constitutes an analytical
stumbling block. Time-honored ter-
minologies and patterns of interpreta-
tion used to apprehend "the world," but
also institutional arrangements that de-
fine the thrust of politics, are being "in-
validated" by the dynamics of global-
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ization, technology, and worldwide
markets.1
- Worldwide and transboundary prob-
lems are accessible to solution only on
the basis of increased international co-
operation. We are living in a system of
divided sovereignties – the possibili-
ties open to nation-states to address ur-
gent issues of the future on their own
are limited. In view of international in-
terdependencies the traditional under-
standing of "national sovereignty" and
an overly narrow definition of national
interests are political dead ends that
lead only into to a failure of politics:
what is essential if the capacity of na-
tion-states to act is to be strengthened is
international cooperation, a selective
relinquishment of sovereignty, and in-
ternational burden-sharing.
- The "principle of nonintervention" i
"internal affairs" is also in need of ad-
                                         
1 The following comments on "foreign policy"
from a Germany dictionary called "Staat und
Politik" (ed. Dieter Nohlen, Munich 1991, pp.
29f.) illustrate that the classical understanding
of foreign policy is no longer adequate to
finding solutions to the new challenges posed
by the world society: "With the aid of foreign
policy society, organizaed in the nation-state,
articulates its interests vis-à-vis other states....
Foreign policy in the classical sense consists of
the activities or omissions of one government
vis-à-vis another government, both of which
constitute, in their entirety, a pattern of
relations. Foreign policy also refers to the
cooperation of one government in multi-,
supra-, and international organizations and/or
conferences.... Foreign policy ... is the
responsibility of foreign ministries and finds
expression in state visits, treaties, or
agreements with other governments as well as
in the form of diplomatic intercourse. Foreign
policy in the broader sense must be understood
to include those aspects of economic, defense,
and cultural policy that have transboundary
significance or consequences, since foreign
policy is increasingly realized as a conjunction
of sovereignty, security, and welfare interests
vis-à-vis the external environment."
justment to the new conditions of
growing international interdependency.
To protect human rights, to contain
civil wars, to combat international
ecological crises, to bring the perpe-
trators of genocide to justice, to moni-
tor compliance with international
agreements, it is necessary to create
binding international rule and moni-
toring systems as the basis for new
forms of "mutual intervention" (of
course in the "affairs of the industrial-
ized countries" as well, e.g. as regards
the implementation of CO2 reductions).
In view of intensifying international in-
terdependencies, internal national logics
will, again and again, have to be prized
open to make room for longer-term global
considerations. Societies that fail to take
adequate account of these new demands
will, in the medium and long term, join the
ranks of the losers of globalization.
2. In Germany - except for the small
political and academic community con-
cerned with foreign and development
policy and global environmental policy -
the fact that we are de facto growing into
an "era of globalism" (Kaiser 1995) is gen-
erally not particularly well understood.
This is shown not least by the subordinate
role accorded in Bonn to development
cooperation. And even in development
cooperation we find that national partis
pris are reproduced: donor coordination is
making little headway (not least due to a
lack of cooperation priorities and barren
competition between the important do-
nors), the practice of aid-tying is still quite
current in development cooperation, and,
even in the context of the EU, there is still
a lack of coordination among the partners
and clear profiles in the development co-
operation of the member states and the
European Union as a whole. Where is it
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written that all countries should have to
cover the entire spectrum of development
cooperation? This is a point in which we
could learn from globally active corpora-
tions, whose strength and success depends
on developing specific competitive advan-
tages instead of (vainly) seeking to operate
in as many business segments as possible.
3. The international organizations
(apart from the Bretton Woods institutions
and the WTO) tend to be weak actors
either lacking the power needed to act or
unequal to the new challenges (like e.g. the
IMF in the face of the volatile international
financial markets). The United Nations has
been unable to expand its role in world
politics since the end of the East-West con-
flict. The time has come for a shakeup of
the international organizations. Reform of
the UN is proceeding at a slow pace, even
though there is no lack of relevant propos-
als. Germany too (as an important global
player) has failed to develop any active
strategy for reforming the UN, narrowing
its own UN policy down to its struggle for
a seat on the Security Council (Stiftung
Entwicklung und Frieden 1997). But it has
also become clear in recent years that the
UN will not be able to be a "power-broker-
age center for global governance," and will
instead more likely have to be content with
a role as a "platform for world forums" and
international mediation tasks.
4. Furthermore, we are also experienc-
ing a crisis of multilateralism, especially
in the USA, but also in Europe. That mul-
tilateral cooperation is (also and precisely
as a consequence of national parochialism)
a complicated and often protracted process
is a fact not to be concealed; that there are,
in many problem areas, no alternatives to it
is a fact often overlooked.
5. The gulf between poor and rich in
the world continues to grow - despite suc-
cessful catch-up processes on the part of a
number of (above all Asian) NICs. The
means available for development coopera-
tion are declining worldwide; the North-
South dialogue has been neglected by the
i dustrialized countries since the mid-
1980s. These are not the right conditions to
boost the cooperation-mindedness of the
weaker countries and to solve future world
problems by means of intensified interna-
tional cooperation and come to terms with
the task of giving political shape to the
globalization process. From the angle of
the developing countries the term "global
governance" often has a threatening ring
about it, one that seems to indicate that the
aim here is to cement institutionally the
hegemonic power of the industrialized
countries and solve problems at the ex-
pense of the developing countries. Without
cooperation with the South, however,
many world problems (climate, ozone,
biodiversity, migration) cannot be brought
to a sustainable solution. Successful devel-
opment cooperation and a sharing of global
burdens are important dimensions of global
governance and at the same time the hu-
mus needed to cultivate viable forms of
international cooperation between de facto
unequal partners.
Against this background it must be con-
ceded that Fred Bergsten, the director of
the Washington Institute for International
Economics, is right in advocating an ex-
panded global multilateralism and calling
for reliable global rules, above all in the
fields of monetary policy, direct invest-
ent, capital flows, competition, environ-
mental protection, industrial safety stan-
dards, and anti-corruption measures. It
might be added that it would also be very
important to harmonize regional regulatory
systems in the problem areas noted. The
international agenda is need of a New
SHAPING GLOBALIZATION 9
Bretton Woods to take on the new, far-
reaching challenges and work through the
long catalogue of unsolved problems. The
goal would have to be a "second transfor-
mation" of capitalism that might, now that
the national market economies have been
tamed by the rule of law and the social
welfare state, concentrate on imbedding
the world market economy in a new, now
global, institutional framework.
3 Don't we already have a
system of global governance?
Of course several elements of "global gov-
ernance" have long existed. To name a few
examples
- the system of international organiza-
tions;
- the crisis management system that
proved its mettle in the monetary and
financial crises in Asia in 1997/98 and
the Latin American debt crisis in the
1980s;
- the world conferences of the 1990s on
sustainable development, population,
human rights, social development,
women, etc.;
- some progress in the area of environ-
mental protection via the development
of internationally binding regimes
(Montreal Protocol, climate agreements
reached in Kyoto, etc.).
Apart from the above-outlined causes of
the "crisis of policy" which are preventing
these elements from coming together to
form a durable patchwork carpet, there are
three important reasons why any attempt
simply to "muddle on" in international
relations is doomed to failure in view of
the pressing future tasks facing world soci-
ety:
1. Hegemonic policies preclude any
cooperative world order: global govern-
ance has prospects only as a cooperative
project. This presupposes that the countries
of the world most capable of acting will
rethink the policies they have traditionally
used to articulate their interests. There is,
above all in the USA, an influential for-
ign-policy wing that is aims to weaken
multilateral organizations and is willing to
contribute to solving world problems only
when this is done under conditions set out
by the United States (Brzezinski 1997). In
Denver in 1997 (G8 summit), at the New
York follow-up conference to Rio in the
summer of 1997, and at the climate confer-
ence in Kyoto, the USA presented itself in
the posture of the only remaining super-
power --and served up "old thinking." The
EU, too, with its antiquated agricultural
policy, which is responsible for palpable
damage to the economies of many devel-
oping countries, is not precisely promoting
the spirit of cooperation-based interna-
tional management. The industrialized
countries must practice cooperation in the
setting of the world community, because
therwise we are faced, in a growing num-
ber of problem areas, with the prospect of a
failure of policy. A self-confident EU, with
a mind to lending a hand in shaping global
affairs and an eye to cooperative interna-
tional collaboration, could set important
signs here. The EU has what it takes to be
a "world heavyweight" - and global gov-
ernance calls for global leadership (cf.
Flavin 1997). One important first step
might be to transform the G8 club of the 7
m st powerful industrialized countries
(plus Russia) into a Global-12 Forum that
would also include other partners from
developing regions essential to solving
world problems (e.g. China, India, Brazil,
South Africa).
2. "Blind spots of international
policy": International crisis management
has thus far worked above all when the
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interests of important global players are
directly threatened: stabilization of the
Asian economies is of great importance for
the structure of the world economy and for
the international banks; quick action is
being taken here, and substantial financial
resources are being mobilized to avert any
spread of the crisis. Other pressing future
problems, though, are approached with far
less emphasis: the negotiations on debt
relief for the poorest developing countries,
which are concerned with comparatively
small financial volumes, have been drag-
ging on for over ten years now; the means
available to alleviate worldwide poverty
show a downward trend. The logic of this
development: regions like Africa (to name
one example) are unimportant and uninter-
esting for the industrialized countries - as
long as they do not give rise to any imme-
diate crises. These "selective forms of
global governance" are not only question-
able for normative reasons of fairness, they
are above all detrimental to any compre-
hensive culture of global cooperation in
world society and undermine the willing-
ness of the weaker countries to cooperate -
in this way diminishing, in the longer per-
spective, the chances of any sustainable
solution to the problems facing the world
(e.g. in the field of ecology), to which
these societies will also have to contribute.
The "blind spots of international coopera-
tion" outlined here also point to the limits
faced by a strategy of solely deliberative
politics in the international system that
places its trust one-sidedly in the self-or-
ganization and long-term orientation of the
global players (Fuhr 1998). Like nation-
states, world society will be unable to rely
exclusively on the goodwill of the most
powerful actors. Binding rule systems and
law were essential elements of the civili-
zation of national societies; and there is
nothing that indicates that a world society
on the road to becoming ever more inter-
dependent will be able to get along without
them.
3. "Crisis management" and "ad hoc-
ism" must be supplanted by "global
policy": Politics at the international level
has until now been marked mainly by "cri-
sis management" (e.g. to contain the Asian
financial crisis; to check the mass murders
in Somalia and Bosnia; to combat the for-
est fires in Asia). Preventive and institu-
tionalized solutions to problems (i.e. the
long-term shape given to development and
structure-building processes.) are the ex-
ception. Global problems, world problems,
are, however, no longer "exceptions," acci-
dents," or "temporary phenomena" but the
normal state of affairs in a globalized
world, albeit one to which we are as yet
unable to provide any sufficient institu-
tional responses. Creating structures of a
world order, developing an architecture of
global governance, means understanding
global policy not only, re-actively, as crisis
management (Reinicke 1998). The man-
agement of global interdependencies is
becoming a permanent task - comparable
to economic, social, and educational policy
in national societies. In his studies on
"world environmental policy" Udo Ernst
Simonis (1996) has pointed to this state of
ffairs.
4 Four dimensions of global
governance
G rmany's external policies are in need of
further development in that their elements
are not yet in line with the new demands.
- The German Foreign Ministry
(Auswärtiges Amt) is - in terms of its
present makeup - not geared to finding
solutions to the world problems out-
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lined and other transboundary political
governance problems that are emerging
from globalization and the intensifica-
tion of international interdependencies
in a growing number of policy fields.
The foreign ministry can de facto no
longer (as was taken for granted in the
past) claim a monopoly on Germany
foreign relations (which it has share
with the "small foreign ministry," the
Ministry for Economic Cooperation
and Development, BMZ), since envi-
ronmental, economic, transportation,
social, science, and research policies,
etc. have long since assumed transna-
tional dimensions (Messner 1998). The
boundaries between domestic and for-
eign policy are no longer sharply de-
fined; "foreign policy" (in the classical
sense, essentially tailored to securing
the peace, opening markets, and fur-
thering cultural exchange), or better:
transboundary policy, has become
enormously differentiated.
- The German Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development has
until now focused on the task of con-
tributing to the development of the
countries of the South.
The globalization process poses prob-
lems that go far beyond the scope of clas-
sical foreign policy (see the note on foreign
policy). This process forces us to funda-
mentally reconsider and rethink the rela-
tionship between "internal" and "external"
policy. It also places new demands on na-
tional policy, opening up, as was noted
above, a new, broad field for international
cooperation and global governance for
which there exist as yet neither viable in-
stitutional structures nor an internationally
acknowledged model. International crisis
management as "ad-hoc-ism" is the conse-
quence.
A new system of global governance
would have four basic dimensions.
4.1 Pillars of a cooperative world
order - creating a global policy
framework
”We must not leave the economic future of the
world up to the automatic pilot”(Peter Southland,
president of the GATT secretariat; epd-Entwick-
lungspolitik, no. 7/98, p.4)
As a country of some significance to the
world economy, Germany must have an
interest of its own in developing a interna-
tional regulative policy, or Ordnungspoli-
tik, for the world economy. There is no
doubt that markets need a organizational
and regulatory framework to be able to
unfold their productive forces and devote
them to the task of social and ecologically
sound development. In an unregulated state
market competition gives rise to social and
ecological races to the bottom. These con-
siderations once applied for national
economies - and they now, in the age of
the global economy, apply at the interna-
tional level as well.
The world trade regime constitutes an
initial element of such a world order. In
addition it is imperative that the latter be
supplemented to include an international
competition regime and an effective
world monetary and financial regime. It
is also essential to envisage the develop-
ment of a world social order which uses a
system of international burden-sharing to
attempt to reduce the risks emerging from
a growing prosperity gap and the margi-
nalization of entire world regions (e.g.
through further development of develop-
ment cooperation; debt relief; minimal
social standards; certification of products
manufactured in compliance with ILO
standards). Development of a w rld envi-
ronmental regime is the fifth pillar of a
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world Ordnungspolitik. A strategy of this
sort would be credible above all if Ger-
many were to engage in serious efforts to
restructure its own economy along ecol-
ogically sound lines.
A global regulative framework presup-
poses a cooperative external and peace
policy and further development of mul-
tilateralism. Former German foreign min-
ister Hans Dietrich Genscher recently, in a
lecture at the University of Duisburg, put
the matter aptly: "The future of the world
depends on whether the world regions seek
confrontation or strive for active tolerance
and cooperation, i.e. a cooperative world
order." This perspective points beyond the
traditional fields of external diplomacy.
What is needed to give shape to the
above-outlined global framework at the
end of the 20th century and under the con-
ditions of a world growing more and more
closely networked is a "reinvention of the
Bretton Woods system." In this context we
are confronted with the question of "policy
competition versus policy coordination and
international cooperation," as was pointed
out by Ewald Nowotny (1997). The other
option is a system characterized by states
locked in a struggle for locational advan-
tages without any regulative framework, a
system which allows for downward spirals
in the fields of social welfare, environ-
mental protection, and taxation. The other
model links economic and political com-
petition for the best solutions with interna-
tional coordination measures, cross-border
cooperation, and basic and minimum
global and regional regulative standards.
Not only is the market an innovative
"process of discovery" [Entdeckungsver-
fahren] (Hayek), political cooperation
mechanisms also contribute to heightening
the capacity to solve social problems.
Development of viable global organiza-
tional structures presents a great challenge:
the Asian crisis has clearly shown that
there are at present no mature proposals for
an institutional integration of the volatile
and crisis-prone international financial
markets and that even our knowledge of
the mechanisms that effectively shape the
international financial markets is underde-
veloped, as the Bank for International
Settlements notes in its annual report for
1997. This it appears to indicate that great
intellectual efforts and institutional inno-
vations are needed to undertake any sus-
tainable steps toward the goals of global
governance. Certain is: the "reinvention of
Bretton Woods" cannot be restricted to
creating hierarchical "world environmental
agencies," "world competition authorities,"
and the like. Any such centralist global
governance architecture would be incom-
patible with the complexity of the prob-
lems facing the world. What will instead
emerge are transnational regulative net-
works: global minimum standards will be
updated, concretized, adapted to specific
national capacities by joint regulative
frameworks in the world regions (e.g. in
the EU); globally stipulated (environ-
mental, social, etc.) standards will, from
case to case, be monitored by national,
regional, or international (public or pri-
vate) organizations; nation states will be
increasingly accountable, and required to
provide information, to supranational ac-
tors; internationally stipulated action plans
will as a rule have to be implemented at the
national level, often by local actors, often
also in the framework of international co-
operation, with locally and internationally
active NGOs contributing to democratic
control and transparency.
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4.2 From North-South cooperation
toward international coopera-
tion in solving global and
transboundary problems
"Resource transfers to promote global public policy
are neither foreign nor aid, but an investment that
provides returns to all." (Foreign Affairs Nov./Dec.
1997)
The development of international coopera-
tion over the past decades can be repre-
sented in three sequences.
* In a first phase development coopera-
tion was tailored to improving the de-
velopment conditions in the partner
countries by transferring (North to
South) know-how and financial re-
sources (not infrequently accompanied
by a good measure of 'sermonizing').
* A second phase saw the growth, since
the mid-1980s, of the insight that the
North too would have to change if the
development chances of the countries
of the South were to be improved
(keyword: "ecological structural ad-
justment in the North"). "Develop-
ment," this much became clear in con-
nection with the discussions over "sus-
tainable development," is not only a
problem of the South, it is a global
challenge.
* In the course of the third phase, in the
1990s, it has become increasingly ap-
parent that globalization and world
problems require an enlargement of the
forms of international cooperation: the
concern now is to recognize that global
and transboundary problems can be
solved only jointly (through changes in,
and deepened forms of cooperation
among, industrialized and developing
countries, NICs and countries in trans-
formation). The donor-recipient con-
figuration typical of previous develop-
ment cooperation is growing less and
less important; joint learning, search,
and problem-solving processes are now
in the foreground of the discussion.
A greater measure of international co-
operation and coordination, supranational
systems of rules and standards, interna-
tionally binding conventions, international
regimes (e.g. concerning b odiversity, mi-
gration, arms export controls), and interna-
tionally coordinated and focused national
strategies and measures aimed at solving
global problems are called for. A "culture
of joint learning," the development of
"international learning communities" are
the keystones of global governance.
Global interdependency and cooperation
management should be used to supple-
ment national policies and existing forms
of North-South cooperation.
The Montreal Protocol on the protection
of the ozone layer is a successful example
of "global policy": the current global
course was successfully changed by link-
ing the international convention with
binding reduction timetables for CFCs,
internationally coordinated packaged of
measures aimed at reducing CFCs, moni-
toring systems to supervise the implemen-
t tion process, technology transfers, and
development-related instruments aimed at
supporting the conversion of CFC-based
production plants in the weaker countries
of the South. The process of a global strat-
egy to reduce energy consumption initiated
in Kyoto is guided by a similar logic in one
of the central policy fields of the 21st cen-
tury. This process will open up further
fields of international cooperation (market
for emission certificates, joint implemen-
tation, development of systems of indica-
tors, monitoring and control systems, in-
ternational research programs, technology
transfer, settlement mechanisms, etc.). As
was demonstrated not least by the world
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conferences of the 1990s (see Mess-
ner/Nuscheler 1996), similar initiatives are
urgently needed in many policy fields. In
order to fully utilize the potential of the
world conferences, it would be essential to
establish an i ternational agenda of the
most pressing problems facing the world
and its future, to set clear-cut priorities,
agree on binding and realistic action time-
tables, in this way laying the groundwork
for global governance.
Global policy and international coop-
eration as elements of global governance,
as outlined here, accordingly imply
- more than "peaceful co-existence;"
- more than an optimized multilateral-
ism;
- more than international crisis manage-
ment in situations of acute hazard;
- more than transfers of financial re-
sources and know-how to strengthen
the development potentials in countries
of the South;
- more than a strengthening of weak in-
ternational organizations; and
- more than a shaping of global frame-
work conditions.
The challenge consists in the develop-
ment of a system of institutions and rules
and new mechanisms of international co-
operation that permit and facilitate a proc-
essing of global challenges and trans-
boundary phenomena on a continuous
basis. Nation-states have in the past two
centuries created institutions and worked
out mechanisms geared to pursuing na-
tional policies and shaping national socie-
ties; we are now once again faced with a
similar search and learning process aimed
at developing viable global governance
structures.
4.3 Democratically legitimated and
normative structural principles
of global governance: elements
required to develop an interna-
tional culture of cooperation
"Any contemplation of one's self must take into
account different viewpoints, time-horizons,
given geographic and social circumstances."
(Krupp 1997, 97)
Learning from constitutional democ-
racies: The development of the constitu-
tional democratic state may be seen as a
(successful) attempt to overcome autoc-
racy, oligarchy, social Darwinism, cultural
and religious intolerance and pave the way
for a regime of democracy, liberty, soli-
darity, compromise, fairness, and social
equity. The international system of the
20th century is marked by the survival of
many structural principles that have been
successively dismantled at the national
level by democratic constitutional and wel-
fare oriented states. Long-term stability in
world society calls (as the history of the
process of civilization in the nation-states
shows) for rule systems conducive to and
based on cooperation, i.e. the "institutional
and legal enclosure" of power.
Global rule of law: The idea of the rule
of law is one of the great achievements of
the modern era and of Western democra-
cies. Global governance, world regulative
policy, is conceivable only by strengthen-
ing the global rule of law. The establish-
ment of an international penal court and
the development of a system of world
ecological jurisdiction would be significant
steps in the right direction. The develop-
ment of a European system of justice dem-
onstrates that an orientation of this kind is
not a naive utopia. In its report, the Com-
mission on Global Governance, which was
inspired by Willy Brandt, notes: "In an
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ideal world, acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court would be a
prerequisite for UN membership." (Com-
mission on Global Governance 1995,
Chapter 6)
Intercultural exchange - the cultural
dimension of global governance: If in the
future a growing number of problems can
be solved only by means of "mutual inter-
vention," a system of global rules, t an -
boundary political networks, and global
governance, then we are in need of a ex-
panding foundation of shared values, stan-
dards, and principles of action. Joint solu-
tions to problems in network-like negotia-
tion systems presuppose, in national socie-
ties and the international system alike, a
minimum measure of confidence, willing-
ness to compromise, and respect for the
legitimate interests of others (Me sner
1997, 228 ff.). Stressing these problems is
not tantamount to a launching a moral ap-
peal. The intention is instead to point out
the functional conditions of global govern-
ance. Against this background the cur-
rently stagnating, or indeed declining, ex-
penditures in the field of external cultural
policy can only be read as a step in the
wrong direction.
Differentiated rule formation in the
system of global governance: Lothar
Brock rightly points out that it would be a
mistake to use global rule formation to
subject countries marked by greatly differ-
ent problems and development levels to
uniform treatment (Brock 1997, 9). Global
rule formation must consider the different
effects entailed by globalization and link
generally valid principles, norms, and rules
with special arrangements for specific
country groups (e.g. least developed coun-
tries, countries in transformation). The
above-mentioned Montreal Protocol is a
constructive example of differentiated rule
formation that consciously subjects the
developing countries to "positive discrimi-
nation; " In the negotiation on the institu-
tional shape to be given to the world econ-
omy (e.g. in the GATT process) the indus-
trialized countries have, however, invaria-
bly rejected any such "concessions." Dif-
ferentiated rule formation processes are
also conceivable between industrialized
countries: Fritz Scharpf (1997, 86f.) pro-
posed with an eye to the EU that the better-
off countries might reach agreement on
demanding environmental or social stan-
dards as a means of eluding the temptation
posed by competitive deregulation. The
less developed countries could then them-
selves agree on joint standards, initially at
a lower level, in order to eliminated the
dumping competition rampant among them
as well; the "lower standards" could then,
in the wake of economic development, be
successively adjusted "upward."
Global development issues: The world
conferences have shown that there are
global development issues that effectively
define the orientation of (national and
global) development and on which the ac-
tors of world society will have reach
agreements in order to successively work
out an "working agenda for world soci-
ety." (Universal) human rights, gender
issues, democracy, and questions of social
equity are such "global development
issues," and they open up difficult fields
for joint learning and transboundary
dialogue. The as yet underdeveloped dis-
cussion on "social equity" and "fairness" in
world society will rapidly gain in signifi-
cance, as was shown in the course of the
climate conference in Kyoto: global gov-
ernance, global problem-solving, implies
that one task at hand is to distribute costs
and benefits and that therefore generally
accepted (substantial and procedural) crite-
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ria of justice will have to be elaborated
(e.g.: what energy reduction goals would
be equitable for which countries? What
should the level be of compensation pay-
ments made by industrialized countries to
developing countries aimed at preserving
the rain forests? Who is to foot the bill for
Asian crisis? Is the contribution-weighted
system of voting rights in the Bretton
Woods institutions just?).
4.4 Reorganization and transfor-
mation of policy in the architec-
ture of global governance
In times of global structural change na-
tional action loses none of its significance.
Global policy cannot succeed without
states that are capable of effective action.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of
national policy is more and more depend-
ent on multilateral arrangements and trans-
boundary cooperation. In being part of the
system of divided sovereignties, nation-
states do not renounce their will to shape
policy; on the contrary, this situation is a
condition required to enlarge political gov-
ernance capacity in a world growing con-
tinuously more interdependent: nation-
states will take on hinge, coordinative,
networking, and monitoring functions; they
will become "interdependency managers"
that are no longer able to solve many
problems on their own but will instead be
forced to rely on network structures.
Global governance will not succeed with-
out an interlinkage of national and global
policy (Messner 1998).
Regional integration projects (like the
EU, NAFTA, etc.) will grow in signifi-
cance. Regional governance is an impor-
tant component of global governance. Co-
operation between regions will also in-
crease. For the EU, NAFTA, APEC,
MERCOSUR, and OAU are potential net-
work partners together with whom trans-
continental problems can be addressed.
Global governance calls for multilevel
policy in the architecture of global govern-
ance. Transboundary and global problems
call not only for new global rule systems
but above all for responses at different lev-
els of political action, from the local to the
national, interregional, and global levels.
Political institutions are as a rule geared
to dealing with geographically limited
problems: local institutions are chiefly re-
sponsible for solving local problems, na-
tional institutions for regulating national
problems, and so on. These structures fail
or present obstacles when e.g. the causes of
problems are international ones (destruc-
tion of forests), calling for international
conventions and rules (international forest
convention) and at the same time necessi-
tating local measures (e.g. reforestation)
which must be monitored and sanctioned
(local, national, and international moni-
toring systems; legally binding conven-
tions, international jurisdiction) to over-
come global and local crises.
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Actors and levels of action in the architecture of global governance
The problems are similar in the field of
climate policy as well. The view that
global environmental problems can be
combated only at the local level, i.e. im-
plying that national policy is powerless, is
mistaken. There are climate protection
measures that have to be coordinated inter-
nationally (e.g. internationally binding
agreements on emission reduction targets)
to eliminate free-rider behavior; there are
other climate protection measures that it
would be better to coordinate internation-
ally, though this is not absolutely essential
(e.g. energy tax); and there are also still a
good number of options for measures that
are not in need of international coordina-
tion (e.g. thermal insulation for buildings,
use of waste heat in industry, speed limits),
though they must be focused to comply
with internationally agreed reduction
timetables.
So multilateralism is indispensable,
though it is not a substitute for fully util-
izing existing available national scopes of
action. Global governance goes beyond
any calls for ”more multilateralism”, and it
calls for a growing measure of cooperation,
coordination, and networking between the
levels of actions outlined above. In view of
globalization, policy will in the future have
o be conceived, and realized, within the
architecture of global governance.
Regional integration projects
(EU, NAFTA, etc.)
Nation-states
Local politics
UN organizations
Private global players
· multilateral corporations
· media
· International baniks
National and global civil society
· NGOs
· Interest organizations
· Science
International regimes
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5 New approaches to develop-
ment cooperation are needed:
self-restraint in development
cooperation or contributions
to global governance?
For development cooperation the question
is what contribution it will and can provide
to developing a global governance archi-
tecture. Here the question will not be
answered but structured. One central issue
is certainly whether future development
cooperation will be oriented primarily to-
ward "niches of international coopera-
tion" (self-restraint in development coop-
eration; concentration on the poorest
countries and/or direct poverty alleviation)
or will (also) be tailored to the "new core
areas of international cooperation." The
issue here is the competence and the com-
parative advantages of the organizations
engaged in development cooperation in the
context of global governance.
5.1 Development cooperation and
the core dimension of global
governance: questions to
structure the issues
This section will present some reflections
intended to adumbrate the direction the
discussion may take. The first question is
whether development cooperation could
provide contributions in the areas that were
addressed above as core elements of a
global governance architecture yet to be
developed, and what these contributions
might consist in; these include:
1. World order, global framework (see
4.1)
2. International cooperation in solving
world and transboundary problems
(global policy in the global governance
architecture) (see 4.2; diagram: Glob-
alization problems – problem types)
3. Democratically legitimated and norma-
tive structural principles of global gov-
ernance (rule of law at the global level;
intercultural exchange - the cultural
dimension of global governance; dif-
ferentiated rule formation in the global
governance system; global develop-
ment issues) (see 4.3)
4. Interlinkage of national and global
policy toward the end of solving prob-
lems in the architecture of global gov-
ernance (see 4.4)
The concern here is not to give answers
but to pose questions that should be ad-
dressed from the perspective of the Ger-
man development ministry and other de-
velopment cooperation institutions:
* Is it reasonable and conceivable to de-
velop North-South development coop-
eration in the direction of a comprehen-
sive international cooperation aimed at
solving world problems, an institutional
framework for globalization processes,
and an invigoration of national and
global governance capacity? Do exist-
ing development cooperation institu-
tions have the potential to become the
core institutions of global governance?
* In what subordinate fields might devel-
opment cooperation bring its experi-
ence and skills to bear?
* In which fields of global governance
are there comparative advantages com-
pared with other institutions and groups
of actors?
* Would it make sense to think in the
direction of a "ministry for global co-
operation and future issues" that fo-
cused the sectoral contributions of
other specialized ministries with an eye
to solving global problems?
* If future development cooperation re-
mains restricted to classical North-
South cooperation, what institutions
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would then be suited to advancing
global governance?
5.2 A minimal strategy to advance
development cooperation un-
der the conditions of globaliza-
tion: defining new focal points
and priorities
A minimal strategy devised to advance
development cooperation would consist in
a further differentiation of current North-
South development cooperation under the
new conditions of globalization. In what
direction should reforms be developed?
First, it continues to be essential to use
development cooperation to strengthen the
internal development potentials of partner
countries (promotion of economic, social,
and ecologically sound development, hu-
man rights and democracy). That there is a
broad potential for incremental change in
this area as well is a point that can only be
noted here (from project orientation to
program orientation; clear-cut priorities
and radical reduction of individual
projects; implementation of sustainable
and significant programs; strengthening of
the governance capacity and reduction of
project-administration activities in the
German development ministry; policy co-
herence; donor coordination; concentration
of public and private activities, etc.) In this
field there is a large measure of concur-
rence in the development community (Holz
1997).
Second, in the future there will be a
greater need for contributions toward
solving world problems and mitigating the
effects of globalization. Looking at things
through the "glasses of world problems
and globalization" can lead to develop-
ment cooperation priorities other than the
present sectoral and country strategies pur-
sued by the German development ministry,
which proceed mainly from national prob-
lem areas. Seven elements would be cru-
cial here:
1. Globalization means, above all from
the perspective of developing countries,
that there is no viable alternative to inte-
gration into the world economy. Countries
that fail to develop national competitive
advantages are doomed to become "wel-
fare cases in the world economy and in
world society." Cooperation aimed at
strengthening competitiveness (under
consideration of ecological sustainability
and fully utilizing synergy effects be-
tween economic and social policy) and
national technological competence is
therefore a topic that is not marginal but
central to development cooperation.
2. A globally oriented development co-
operation must support the partner coun-
tries in developing contributions of their
own to global governance. It is only good
performers who are in a position to keep
the internal variables of global problems
(e.g. population growth, energy consump-
tion) effectively under control and cooper-
ate on an equal footing in the architecture
of global governance. Global governance
can work only if policy formulation at the
global, regional, national, and local levels
complement each other. Here there are
many points of contact with the develop-
ment cooperation currently practiced,
though new priorities may emerge in the
areas particularly relevant to solving world
problems (e.g. strengthening the state's
governance capacity; training national ex-
perts for global problems - "interdepen-
dency managers" - international coopera-
tion management). While the international
development cooperation of the 1980s and
1990s, based on the so-called Washington
consensus, was rooted in the ideology of
the 'minimal state' and sweeping deregula-
20 DIRK MESSNER
tion, the concern now is (again) to
strengthen the institutional structures
(public and private) in the partner countries
in order to be able to effectively deal with
national and global problems. Here it is
time to embark on new paths, since the
neoliberal renunciation of policy has
proven impracticable, and it is not possible
to return to the failed, one-sidedly statist
policy concepts of the 1960s and 1970s.
The potentials of governance based on
market, state, and networks and their com-
plementarities, must be focused with an
eye to strengthening the learning and
problem-solving capacities of societies
(Messner 1995).
3. It could make sense to concentrate
development cooperation funds in fields
directly concerned with solving world-
wide problems. For this purpose it would
be helpful to work out an agenda of the
most pressing world problems. Focal
points and priority fields other than those
that might be expected on the basis of the
"nationally oriented" country strategies
presently pursued by the German devel-
opment ministry would emerge from this
perspective. The conclusion might, for
instance, be drawn that it would be best to
invest development cooperation funds in
China, India, and Brazil above all in the
field of rational and regenerative energy
systems, bearing in mind that, in view of
the sheer size of these countries and their
populations, it is possible to solve global
climate problems only if these societies
succeed in achieving a "turnaround in en-
ergy." It would be important to bear in
mind that the correct and reasonable ori-
entation of development cooperation to-
ward fields that might be harnessed to gov-
ern global trends and solve world problems
should not be allowed to lead to a counter-
productive neglect of other areas signifi-
cant for these countries' internal develop-
ment (i.e. also, in the long term, significant
for their general problem-solving compe-
tence and willingness to cooperate in the
architecture of global governance). In
some cases win-win situation are entirely
conceivable; approaches to solving na-
tional and global problems can reinforce
each other mutually (example: in Africa,
concentration on the world problem of
population development; initiatives in the
areas of preventive health care / poverty
reduction / investment in the education and
training of girls). A "global-governance-
centered development cooperation" would,
however, (in view of the real scarcity of
financial resources) lead to priorities other
than e.g. a development cooperation
tailored mainly to poverty issues. These
goal conflicts must be addressed.
4. Seen from the perspective of world
problems, it would make no sense at all to
concentrate development cooperation on
the poorest countries (as is often demanded
with reference to the intended poverty ori-
ntation of development cooperation). No
solution of global problems is conceiv-
able without close cooperation with
NICs and high-population countries like
China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil.
Moreover, in all regions the development
d namics of the smaller countries are de-
pendent on the development dynamics of
larger neighboring countries (e.g. the de-
velopment chances of Bolivia, Paraguay,
or Uruguay on Brazil's development dy-
namics). This should be understood not as
a plea against the efforts to alleviate
worldwide poverty but as a plea for a more
c mplex system of international coopera-
tion.
5. Support for projects geared to re-
gional cooperation and integration
would have to gain in importance. In the
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regions it would be possible to recover
action potentials that have been lost at the
national level (regional governance). The
regions could at the same time develop
problem-solving capacities that could be
used to relieve frequently overtaxed global
organizations (e.g. the UN; e.g. by devel-
oping regional conflict-regulation mecha-
nisms in Africa). Regional cooperation
(e.g. in MERCOSUR) furthermore
strengthens the chances of developing
countries to participate actively in giving
shape to globalization.
6. Fields for joint learning involving
industrialized and developing countries
could grow in significance, enlarging the
classical scheme of North-South transfers.
Worldwide problem constellations (see
diagram: ”Globalization problems – prob-
lem types”) that call for joint learning
might, for instance, include: governability
of megacities; approaches to linking com-
petitiveness and sustainability; concepts
for employment policies; forms of public-
private partnership. A globalized and com-
plex world offers better chances, and in-
creases the necessity, to engage in joint
search processes for best-practice methods
(global knowledge management; "bench-
marking processes," international learning
communities). Development cooperation
organizations could develop into important
nodal points of transboundary networks in
which solutions to common problems are
sought. One important challenge of the
future (for developing and industrialized
countries alike) will consist in monitoring
and focusing the knowledge available
worldwide, rapidly learning from the expe-
riences of other countries, and turning this
know-how to account in solving practical
problems. New information and communi-
cation technologies (like the Internet) are
here opening up new horizons. Develop-
ment cooperation could be one of the
driving forces of this process.
7. New forms of public-private part-
nership must be built up in development
cooperation, since many environmental
problems are not accessible to solution
without the financial, organizational, and
technological resources of (transnationally
operating) corporations and the warning,
control, and publicity functions of interna-
tionally active NGOs. It will be important
to look into and test in practice the options
that might be opened up by focusing and
concentrating private- and public-sector
potentials. The private sector, profiting as
it does from globalization, cannot help but
to be directly interested in having a stable
global framework and a level global play-
ing field. At the same time many reasons
can be cited for appropriately involving the
holders of private assets, e.g. via a minimal
tax on international financial transfers
(Tobin Tax), in covering the costs and ad-
dressing the task of giving shape to the
process of globalization. It is important to
strengthen internationally operating NGOs
in that they may well constitute the core
needed to develop an international civil
society without which globalization is
doomed to end up in crises of political le-
gitimacy and problems of democratization.
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Development cooperation and global
governance: new priorities
1. Strengthening competitiveness (under
consideration of ecological
sustainability and full utilization of
synergy effects between economic and
social policy) and national technologi-
cal competence in developing countries
2. Supporting partner countries in pro-
viding their own contributions to global
governance
3. Focusing development cooperation
with an eye to solving world problems
(agenda of the most pressing world
problems)
4. Further developing and enlarging coop-
eration with NICs and high-population
countries on solving world problems
5. Intensifying support of regional inte-
gration projects (regional governance)
and problem-solving capacities in the
regions
6. Developing fields for joint learning
between development cooperation, the
private sector, and NGOs (focusing
problem-solving capacities, strength-
ening mutual control, utilizing the po-
tentials of market-, state-, and network-
level governance)
6 Is global governance a realis-
tic perspective?
States are at first naturally not enthusiastic
about any curtailment of their autonomy by
multilateral rule systems. But if states want
to avoid seeing the costs of their autonomy
ambitions grow without end (increasing
policy failure in the face of transboundary
problems), they will have no other choice
than to accept restriction of their autonomy
through principles, standards, rules,
agreed-upon procedures.
It is the insight into the
- growing and intensifying spatial, tem-
poral, and causal interdependencies in
world society, leading to mutual de-
pendencies between countries, regions,
and groups of actors;
- unpredictability of success or failure,
limited scope and risks involved in one-
sided strategies in the political and
business spheres geared to competition
and achieving narrowly defined na-
tional interests;
- generally high uncertainty arising for
all actors involved from the intrinsic
dynamics of unregulated systems - like
the international financial markets, the
logic of global locational competition,
or technological development;
may prove conducive to a cooperative
global governance project. One other thing
that is certain: the alternatives to a coop-
rative global governance system (insula-
tion; renunciation of the benefits involved
in taking a hand in shaping the globaliza-
tion process; hope for a prudent world
policy on the part of the hegemon USA)
are not viable.
Germany is not only "affected" by
globalization, it is itself a weighty global
player with options of its own. This is all
the more true of the European Union,
which, due to its economic might, its
emerging single currency zone, the size of
its internal market, and its technological
potential, can play a leadership role in the
process of developing a viable global gov-
ernance architecture. With its accumulated
supranational (positive and negative) expe-
riences (policy coordination, multilevel
policies, gradual replacement of national
views by European ones) which could play
a crucial role in solving world problems,
the EU is the world's most advanced re-
gional integration project. There are good
reason to believe that the USA, in its prac-
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ticed and internalized role as superpower
and ”world policeman”, will find it much
more difficult to promote any cooperative
global governance project.
The future social and ecological shape
given to the EU's economy and external
relations will have decisive effects on the
direction taken by globalization. What,
then, would speak against a protagonist
role for the EU and an active commitment
on the part of the leading European power
Germany in the direction of global govern-
ance?
In the medium term "visions," scenarios
of possible development paths, are needed
to initiate changes and structural reforms.
The model of "global governance" consti-
tutes a frame of reference that might be
used to develop institutional innovations
geared to strengthening political govern-
ance capacity and solving the future prob-
lems facing the world. There are a great
variety of particularist interests and power
blockades operating counter to any devel-
opment of this kind. But: models that be-
come more fascinating in the course of the
political process, gain the power to guide
action, can also influence the dynamics of
global policy.
One current example of the power of
ideas and models is that an untiring inter-
national expert community has succeeded
in the course of recent years in lodging in
the minds of people the notion that CO2
reductions are essential to solving world-
wide environmental problems. An in fact
positive development has been set in mo-
tion here (e.g. the first steps toward CO2
emission reduction processes in connection
with the climate conference in Kyoto). In
other areas (e.g. international financial
markets) no success has been met with (as
yet) in breaking up the worldwide domi-
nance of tendencies working in the direc-
tion of deregulation strategies and a renun-
ciation of public policy, although it is by
no means certain that the distributional
effects and adjustment constraints set in
motion by the climate agreements (for the
powerful industrialized countries as well)
will be of less import than, for instance, the
introduction of a Tobin-type tax.
The success of global governance thus
depends on whether policy and scholarship
succeed in pointing clearly to the essential
significance of this future project for
peaceful development within world society
and as a means of preventing a "disem-
powerment of policy." Willy Brandt's Ost-
politik, Nelson Mandela's policy of recon-
ciliation, the political integration of Europe
following two devastating world wars were
also visions that at first seemed far re-
moved from reality.
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Old Wine in New Skins
Some critical comments on
the UNDP Reports
I must preface my critical comments with
the remark that in 1990 I euphorically wel-
comed the first Human Development Re-
port (HDR). For me, the initial criticisms
of the design of the Human Development
Index (HDI) were statistical quibbling, and
I regarded any faultfinding with the con-
cept Human Development as low blows
from people who saw in the HDR an un-
necessary and irksome rival to the World
Bank's World Development Report
(WDR), until then the Bible of interna-
tional development policy.
I welcomed the HDR because it con-
curred with my own understanding of de-
velopment, now giving it the blessing of a
weighty UN organization. We (i.e. the
Foundation and Institute for Develop-
ment and Peace) not only milked the
HDRs' statistics for our Global Trends, we
also conveyed the arguments and messages
the reports contained. And indeed, the co-
operation between UNDP and Foundation
grows out of a programmatic affinity.
So I am not an ideological fundamen-
talist like many others in the development-
science community, who have for the
UNDP Report no more than a pitying
smile. I am, rather, critical of immoderate
claims to originality, of unfledged index
designs and major data gaps, of incon-
sistent arguments and illusionary goal
projections. I will explain why I have
turned from an apologist to critic, though,
be it said, I am still not a fundamental
critic.
The eight HDRs that have appeared to
date deal with a broad spectrum of sub-
jects. UNDP's position is in many cases
worthy of discussion. I will have to restrict
myself to a limited number of points that
seem particularly important to me and con-
centrate on the question whether uman
development is more than old wine in new
skins. I will sum up my reflections in eight
theses.
Thesis 1
UNDP's claim to have offered in its hu-
man development concept a new devel-
opment paradigm ignores ideas already
conceived by others, flouting a commodity
fetishism that it imputes to the World
Bank, from which, however, the latter is in
fact far removed.
The first lines of the first HDR, which
appeared in 1990, started out with a cri-
tique of the overestimation of economic
growth as a measure of development. In
1990 such criticism was still topical,
though it had long since ceased to be
novel, having, since the 1970s, constituted
a key component of the so-called "critical
theory of development," which of course
did have a tendency to veer off into undif-
ferentiated criticism of growth.
The blanket indictment, obviously for-
mulated with an eye to the World Bank,
that since the end of the Second World
War the rate of growth of per capita in-
come has been held to be the 'single meas-
ure of development' does justice neither to
the World Bank nor to the academic
brotherhood of development economics.
What we see here is the construction of a
bogeyman. One of the pioneers of devel-
opment economics, Arthur Lewis (1955:
420), underscored over forty years ago:
"The advantage of economic growth is not
that wealth increases but it increases the
range of human choice - the case for eco-
nomic growth is that it gives man greater
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control over his environment, and thereby
increases his freedom - economic growth
also gives us freedom to choose greater
leisure."
As we will see, this sentence already
contains the quintessence of human
development as it is understood by UNDP.
Why is it that he was not included in the
hall of ancestors of philosophers and clas-
sics of political economy whose prec pts
on the meaning and purpose of economics
are used by UNDP to ground its ethics of
human development?
UNDP Administrator William H.
Draper III, in a foreword to the first edi-
tion of the HDR, extolled the rediscovery
of the "essential truth that people must be
at the centre of all development." This
credo was not only part and parcel of many
a socioethical declaration of principles of
ecclesiastical provenance, it was also al-
ready to be found in many UN documents.
The famous 1974 Cocoyoc Declaration
began with the sentence that the only pos-
sible concern can be to develop people, not
things. Thinking on development prior to
the appearance of the HDR was not so in-
human at all. One can hardly help contra-
dicting the blanket indictment. Those who
step on other people's toes run the risk of
being kicked.
What was spectacular about the HDR
was that the most important UN organiza-
tion in the field of development seized
upon such ideas, focusing them into a cri-
tique of the neoliberal project and its
agents, the powerful Bretton Woods insti-
tutions. It was not so much the develop-
ment-related theoretical substance as it
was the development-policy-related thrust
that procured international resonance for
the HDR - above all among those who now
had a reference document for their criti-
cism of the neoliberal project.
I am, be it said, certain that the HDR
was unable to convert one single dyed-in-
he-wool growth theorist. I also noted that
many development experts in academic
and political communities did not even
take cognizance of it. As opposed to the
World Bank, UNDP's problem is not only
a financial one, it is an image and rele-
vance problem.
Thesis 2
The concept of human development
claims theoretical originality for itself in
the field of development, but it is more an
omnium gatherum of set pieces from the
world of the theor tical discourse on
development, reshuffled and decked out
with a new definition.
Anyone familiar with the debate over
the basic-needs strategy conducted during
the 1970s - initiated, incidentally, by the
World Bank and conducted by its then
director Mahbub ul Haq - cannot help but
be tempted to substitute social develop-
ment for human development. In the in-
dicator discussion conducted by UNRISD,
too, there were proposals that came very
cl se to the design of and reasoning behind
the Human Development Index (HDI).
The HDI centers on social indicators
(namely, life expectancy at birth and rates
of literacy and school enrollment), which
were earlier used as core indicators of so-
cial development (see Nohlen/Nuscheler
1992).
The HDR team, headed by Mahbub ul
Haq and Inge Kaul, nevertheless sought to
differentiate their position from all con-
ventional theories of development. The
team accused the theories of the formation
of human capital of viewing people
merely as instruments and not as benefi-
ciaries of the production of goods. It on the
other hand blamed welfare theories for
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treating people more as passive benefi-
ciaries than as active agents of the devel-
opment process. It faulted the basic-needs
strategy - as did, incidentally, Winfried
Pinger, a member of the Bundestag in the
German debate over developm nt - for
having placed more weight on the provi-
sion of goods and services than on the
creation of capabilities and choices.
And what is new and distinctive about
human development? The answer of the
HDR project team is:
Human development, by contrast, brings
together the production and distribution of
commodities and the expansion and use of
human capabilities. It also focusses on
choices - on what people should have, be
and do to be able to ensure their own live-
lihood. (HDR 1990: 11)
This goal definition is a definitory
masterpiece with literary quality. The only
bothersome thing about it is its claim to be
at odds with everything that has even been
thought in development theory. An African
critic (Yash Tandon 1996) accused the
HDR team of merely exploiting the edifice
of development theory as a quarry, picking
out of it what suits its needs, but ignoring,
or indeed caricaturing, argumentative con-
texts. Thus it is that the position asserting
its difference from the basic-needs strategy
overlooks the fact that the lat er was by no
means keyed solely to governmental sup-
port for groups of the poor but aimed, also
and precisely, at enabli g these people to
help themselves (i.e. at forming capabili-
ties and widening choices) (see Nuscheler
1982).
Mahbub ul Haq had already said much
of what he said and wrote as the head of
the first HDR team in his book on the
"Poverty Curtain," written while he was
still director of the World Bank. I found
what he wrote back then reasonable. And I
can find again, particularly in the 1997
HDR, much of what he and other pioneers
of development theory - such as Dudley
Seers, Paul Streeten, or Gunnar Myrdal
- were writing back then as arguments for
the alleviation of poverty. Nearly every
idea has already been thought. So why
does the HDR act as though it had rein-
vented the wheel of developm nt theory,
created a new development paradigm by
thinking up a new term?
Thesis 3
UNDP uses the World Bank as the punch-
ing bag of its growth critique, though it has
more in common with the World Bank
than it would like to think. UNDP's growth
critique evaporates in a sham ends-means
conflict, one that furthermore deflects our
attention from the imperatives of su tain-
able development.
It is true that the World Bank continues
to use per capita income as a key indicator
of a given country's level of development
as well as to form country groups. It con-
tinues to use per capital income as a pri-
mary measure of development, but has
long since stopped using it as "the sole
measure of development," as is insinuated
by the 1990 HDR (p. 104), hidden among
"technical notes." The 1996 HDR (p. 1),
however, noted that "more economic
gr wth, not less, will generally be needed
as the world enters the 21st century".
What's the difference? UNDP likes to
see it in the purpose of growth: whether the
latter is seen as the goal of development or
as a means of widening choices. But it
simply is not possible to use this differen-
tiation of means and ends to distinguish
between good growth and bad growth - and
to reserve the good cause for one's self (see
Ravallion 1997).
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Anyone who compares the 1990 HDR
with the 1990 WDR, focusing on "pov-
erty," will find it difficult to discover a
contrasting program between these two
reports. Both call for more growth as a
means and as a goal of poverty alleviation.
The means-ends conflict turns out to be a
sham conflict, one that in addition diverts
our attention from the important questions
raised by the imperative of sustainable
development.
Under the pressure of the public criti-
cism the World Bank responded more sen-
sitively to the Rio agenda than UNDP,
which was more concerned with the
agenda of the Copenhagen World Social
Summit. But what is needed to secure the
future is a synthesis of social and ecologi-
cal development. The 1992 HDR did, it is
true, announce an ecologically chastened
HDI, but it has until now not kept its
promise. Here, as in the case of the P liti-
cal Freedom Index (PFI), what we are
confronted with is not only the data prob-
lem but the far larger methodological
problem of aggregating different structural
and process indicators. But why is it that
the HDR team fails to think before an-
nouncing intentions and awakening x-
pectations?
Once it has been noted (correctly) that
more growth is needed to supply a growing
world population with vital goods and
services, we run up against an incongruity
in the index designs. It might even be pos-
sible to argue about whether, in calculating
the HDI, PPP, i.e. real purchasing power
per capita, should not be more strongly
weighted as a potential variable than the
two other social components that go into
its making (i.e. life expectancy at birth and
the rate of literacy and school enrollments).
But that fact that both the Capability Pov-
erty Measure, which aims not to measure
income-related poverty but to detect the
lack of means required to develop human
capabilities, and the HPI (uman Poverty
Index) set up by the HDR in 1997, wholly
disregard PPP as a potential variable is
simply injudicious.
The HPI defines an "inadequate living
s andard" with the aid of three variables:
access to health services and clean drink-
ing water and the share of undernourished
children under five years of age. In indi-
cator theory the three social indicators are
as a rule subsumed under the "key indica-
tor" life expectancy at birth. The HDI does
of course use and justify it as such. Where
are we here to see the gain in knowledge
over the HDI? Is it not the case that the
latter is not only differentiated by the HPI
but more or less depreciated as UNDP's
actual innovation? These are not rhetorical
questions, they are inquiries directed to the
address of the designers of the HPI.
Per capita income or PPP alone is not
sufficient to measure poverty or prosperity,
but is it is, like it or not, the potential that
opens up choices and is seen in the
grounding of the HDI as an "indirect indi-
cator of capabilities and potentials." The
line of argument advanced by the 1997
HDR (p. 18) is therefore somewhat incon-
sistent, i.e. that private income " uld not
be an adequate indicator of an individual's
economic facilities, which also include
crucial public services (such as health care
arrangements and a safe water supply)."
Why, if I may ask, is it then that the HDI
does not refrain from measuring income
poverty by means of real purchasing power
(PPP)? Was it not supposed to indicate
choices and accesses to public goods and
services? I see here a lack of logical con-
sistency between the different index de-
signs. The answer given by the HDR 1997
(p. 20) is not convincing:
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"The availability of GNP measures does
not obviate the need for an income-based
poverty indicator, nor does the HDI meas-
ure eliminate the need for an HPI."
Thesis 4
The HDR criticizes the market-oriented
approach and the sociopolitical impacts of
neoliberalism, but was unable to evade
entanglement in its cultural hegemony,
which finds expression in the HDR's indi-
vidualistic image of man. "Freedom of
choice" belongs to the credo of liberalism.
The definition of human development
as a "process of widening people's choices"
links two strategic goals of development:
the formation of capabilities and the utili-
zation of these capabilities for purposes
that serve human development. It is possi-
ble to rediscover in this definition, above
all in its focus on widening choices, the
individualism cultivated in liberalism (see
Wohlmuth 1990). "Freedom of choice" is
the title of a famous book by Milton
Friedman. Between "freedom of choice"
in the credo of liberalism and the definition
of human development as the "process of
widening people's choices" there is an un-
derlying anthropological consensus.
The basic liberal consensus reflected at
the same time in the international declara-
tions on the universality of humans rights
is a ramification of the triumph of the
West, of its economic and social model. I
must ask myself, though, how mo
oeconomicus, in pursuit of choices, happi-
ness, and self-fulfillment, can be expected
to develop solidary patterns of thought and
behavior and how the world community is
to summon up concrete acts of solidarity
without the regulative ideas of justice and
solidarity demanded of it by the HDR to
overcome poverty in the world. Its pro-
posed solutions look to a "social-demo-
cratic consensus" à la Brandt Report,
which has in the meantime been overrun
by the neoliberal turn of events.
It seems as though the HDR team re-
frained from thinking too deeply about the
image of man on which its uman devel-
opment concept is based. Its attacks on
neoliberalism conceal the fact that the
answers to its big question, "what people
should have, be, and do to be able to en-
sure their own livelhood," do not differ in
any fundamental way from the answers
provided by the World Bank. True, UNDP,
which plays no more than a marginal role
in international development policy, is
seeking to use the HDR to build up its
image vis-à-vis the powerful World Bank,
but it fails to get beyond the underlying
liberal consensus. It is not so much that
this is deserving of criticism as that it is in
n ed of explanation when the concern is to
ground an alternative to the neoliberal
project.
Thesis 5
It is not only in their selection and justifi-
cation of important indicators of human
development but also in their value judg-
ments that the UNDP Reports are incon-
sistent. The political pressure to which a
UN organization is exposed, forcing it into
diplomatic compromises, has impaired the
credibility of the HDR project.
I look in vain for argumentative consis-
tency above all in the 1996 HDR, which
critics regard as the weakest Report of all
in theoretical and analytical terms (see
Tandon 1996). Under the impression of
the surges of growth and development in
East and Southeast Asia - and doubtless
under the diplomatic pressure of the re-
gimes there - this Report revised not only
its critical position on growth but also the
professed commitment to political freedom
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encapsulated in its Political Freedom In-
dex (PFI).
This lapse from the faith is to be found
above all in the 1996 HDR, which cites
China as evidence that economic growth
and human development can harmonize -
in the process forgetting everything that
earlier Reports had said about the tandem
of human development, freedom, and
sustainability. This political kowtowing to
the regimes in East and Southeast Asia,
which link ecological ruthlessness with
"Asian values," i.e. repudiation of the uni-
versality of human rights, has heavily
damaged the credibility of the HDR
project.
Even if we take into account the politi-
cal pressure to which a UN organization is
inevitably exposed, this carte blanche for a
dictatorship, following the declaration of
principles in the 1990 HDR, is incompre-
hensible: "Human freedom is vital for hu-
man development." What, then, is this
normative principle supposed to be worth?
Will all political value judgments now
have to be suspected of being framed with
an eye to diplomatic niceties? Here the
HDR is losing is power of conviction and
credibility for groups of civil society, for
whom human security means precisely
the indivisibility of political and social
human rights.
Incidentally, this normative concept of
human security amounts to a real innova-
tion in the scholarly discussion on peace
and development in that it reduces to one
common concept freedom from political
repression and freedom from existential
privation, at the same time extricating the
concept of security from its narrow mili-
tary context. But why is it that UNDP had
to depreciate it again by making reference
here to the "model" of China? This incon-
sistency in a core area of human devel-
opment annoys me.
Thesis 6
What earned for the HDR its greatest in-
ternational respect is at the same time a
point on which it stands accused: the HDI's
design. What would, however, make more
sense would be to level criticism at the
inflationary use of indices that have not
reached the state of methodological matur-
ity, stand on unsafe ground, and rely in
part on completely obsolete data. UNDP
seems to have an index mania.
I found convincing Paul Streetens'
assessment (1994: 235) that the HDI, while
displaying analytical weaknesses, all the
same revealed even greater weaknesses on
the part of other indices. The HDI uses two
social indicators to which indicator theory
assigns a key strategic function with reper-
cussions for all other areas of life (see
Addicks 1977: 331). One of the reasons
why Paul Streeten defended the HDI was
that its mean values say more about the
distribution of resources than does average
per capita income. With the two social
indicators, it is not possible for a small
minority to substantially raise the mean
values, which is possible with income dis-
tribution.
Of course the HDI, too, fails to solve
either the methodological problem of an
adequate weighting between its three sub-
components or the fundamental problem of
the reliability and comparability of the
data. It raises the claim to an objectivity
and reality of living conditions that, thanks
to its precarious data situation, it simply
does not have. And for this reason its
country ranking, which has earned it a lot
of political turmoil, is highly problemati-
cal. With the CIS states the social indic -
tors, based as they are on data from the
CRITICAL COMMENTS ON UNDP REPORTS 31
1980s, veil the immiseration of broad seg-
ments of the population in the 1990s, a
process that has already been termed
"tiersmondization."
The mathematics done by any such rat-
ing can only be as good as the data on
which it is based. A comparison of the data
used by the HDI with the data published by
the World Bank in its Social Indicators of
Development awakens more doubts than
confidence. It is of course not as though
the World Bank had completely ignored
the social and ecological dimensions of
development. The data compendia for
Social Indicators of Development or
Women in Development make it difficult
for UNDP to gain a profile as a social think
tank in the UN system. The World Bank
not only has far more money, it also has
more analytical and statistical competence
- in all areas relevant to development.
The different issues of the HDR have
sought to employ disaggregated indices to
diminish the problem of mean values
which level out the disparities between
town and country, social classes and gen-
ders. This attempt was highly meritorious
and awakened great expectations in all of
those concerned with the distribution
problem. One particularly meritorious as-
pect was the design of the GDI (Gender-
related Development Index) and the
GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure),
both of which attempt to depict the dispar-
ity between the sexes and measure their
different chances of advancement in in-
dustry and politics. Both indices demon-
strate, for instance, that equal opportunity
is not a question of income levels - which
further diminishes the informative value of
per capita income as a measure of devel-
opment.
But what irritated me, having gone
through eight HDRs, was the constant
tinkering with new indices, which, instead
of being improved step by step, have, in
part, been abandoned as soon as design or
data problems emerged. You need some
s atistical knowledge and sophistry to
make out the differences between HDI,
HPI, and CPM (Capability Poverty
Measure), between the GDI and the GEM.
Even experts have to look hard to find the
advantages of and catches to the individual
indices. The ordinary consumer has a need
for clarity and simplicity - and falls back
upon the WDR. It would also be far more
important to eliminate the many blanks
than to offer more and more new indices
with more and more blanks. This inflation-
ary proliferation has diminished the value
of the HDI's innovation.
Thesis 7
The 1997 HDR on the one hand announces
and justifies a message significant in terms
of development theory and policy, f rcing
the neoliberal project its rethink its line of
argumentation: that growth and distribu-
tion do not exclude but condition one an-
other reciprocally.
The empirical proof can be found in the
history of today's industrialized countries,
but also in the success story of the East and
Southeast Asian NICs. The "tigers" from
the Far East have not only achieved high
growth rates and major surges of industri-
alization, they have also, thanks to an ac-
tive social and distributional policy, di-
minished poverty, developed, by selec-
tively investing in the fields of education
and health care, the human capital needed
f r development, and have also, as a side-
effect of poverty alleviation, been able to
lower population growth into the bargain.
The HDR infers from this success story
the following eneralizable precepts:
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- One-sided promotion of markets and
growth does not improve the lot of the
poor as long as it is not combined with
a distributional policy that seeks to mo-
bilize groups of the poor as growth and
development potentials.
- A combination of promotion of growth
and social policy is not only an ethical
imperative, it also makes economic
sense.
- Poverty alleviation does not at all mean
doing without growth, it means
"growth from below," because it is only
by means of an active social policy that
groups of the poor are enabled to pro-
duce, and to consume, more. Poverty
reduction triggers growth impulses be-
cause it, in improving education and
health, increases human productivity,
the willingness to take risks, and mo-
bility.
The problem with this line of argument,
which was likewise developed in the 1970s
to justify the basic-needs strategy (see
Nuscheler 1982), is to be sought in the
generalization of the success story of the
Far East. And it was made possible by spe-
cific conditions that cannot simply be
transferred to other regions of the world.
This is why any attempt to derive prospects
of succeeding in eradicating poverty
throughout the world from the success of a
"dozen developing countries" is a ques-
tionable endeavor.
Thesis 8
The 1997 HDR, on the other hand, con-
stitutes an embarassment in the field of
development affairs. I regard its thesis that
there exists a "practical possibility," with a
few billions of additional development
assistance, to create a world without pov-
erty not even as a concrete utopia, I see it
as a dangerous illusion. More realistic is
the goal set by the OECD of halving pov-
erty by the year 2015.
This illusion in view of a growing world
population and ever-scarcer resources,
particularly in poverty regions, is counter-
productive in terms of development policy
as well, because it is not suited to take the
wind out of the sails of the attacks on pov-
erty alleviation - e.g. on the part of the
German development ministry's Scientific
Advisory Board. The Advisory Board had
noted just prior to the Copenhagen World
Social Summit:
"But it was and is clear to everyone fa-
miliar with the subject that it lies beyond
he scope of development cooperation to
engage in poverty alleviation, effectively
and globally, for billions of people, par-
ticularly in view of persistent population
growth."
Nota bene: The issue here was not the
elimination but the all viation of poverty.
The Advisory Board disputes the compe-
tence of anyone who commits himself to
this allegedly illusionary goal of poverty
alleviation. But the 1997 HDR sets its goal
even higher - a goal so high that it is bound
to overtax even the "principle of hope."
I have therefore recommended to the
Catholic relief organiz tion MISEREOR
that it not use arguments from the 1997
HDR to underpin its planned 1998 cam-
paign "The Poor First," because not even
the "noble souls" in church relief organi-
zations should seek to fob off their donors
with illusions. I instead recommend to the
NGO's to concentrate all of their energies
on achieving the goal set by the OECD
(1996) of halving poverty by the year
2015. It would be a great success if even
this goal could be achieved. And the
OECD countries would have to do far
more than they are presently willing to do
in view of shrinking development budgets.
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They would, for instance, at least have to
implement the "20/20 Initiative" propa-
gated by UNDP and acclaimed by the
Copenhagen World Social Summit. But
they are as yet more or less far removed
even from this modest target set by them
themselves.
One can set morally desirable goals so
high that they remain beyond any realistic
bounds, thus losing any action-orienting
power that they might otherwise have had.
It is unfortunate that the 1997 HDR was, as
it seems, bent on confirming the prejudice
that it is not worthwhile to read the UNDP
Reports; unfortunate as well in that in this
way important knowledge on the interac-
tion between growth policy and distribu-
tional policy could end up being ignored.
Summary
I have already, several times, indicated that
I share, or shared until 1997, the ambiva-
lent position held by Paul Streeten (1994).
While addressing some criticism toward
the HDRs, he still defended them as valu-
able in an overarching sense. It is for this
reason that I cannot share the sharp criti-
cism of Yash Tandon, which culminated
in the accusation that UNDP takes the part
of a policy that toes the line of interna-
tional capital. For me, its submission to
political pressure from Asia is a more ob-
vious point.
And what is left of the achievements of
the UNDP Reports and the human devel-
opment concept? They did not reinvent the
wheel of history, though they have rea-
ligned some of its spokes. Human devel-
opment is more than some potpourri
cobbled together from a variety of set
pieces, trimmed with pretty figures, as
Yash Tandon sarcastically commented;
but it is not a new and consistent develop-
ment paradigm, either: i.e. in fact old wine
in new skins, though the latter have been
relabled. But sometimes even new pack-
aging can draw more attention to old con-
tents.
The great achievement of the eight
HDRs that have appeared to date is to have
procured, once again, more weight in inter-
national development policy for the social
human rights and the primacy of poverty
alleviation that have flowed into the HDR.
The action program adopted in Copen-
hagen was also a success for UNDP. This
mpact of the human development con-
cept should not be underestimated.
In spite of the 1997 HDR, worthy of
criticism as it may be, I remain a critical
sympathizer, and continue to demand of
my students that they read the HDR on top
of the WDR, because the former consti-
tutes a normative corrective, providing
illustrative material on the methodological
problems involved in index design. Un-
solved problems are often more instructive
than successful solutions. This, however, is
true only of the academic playground, not
for development policy, which is con-
cerned with life and death.
We shall have to persist in the search
for a new development paradigm, because
human development has yet to conclude
this search process. But it has at least set
up a few signposts. Here I mean above all
the new, heightened view of social devel-
opment - both as an imperative of social
human rights and as a means of widening
peoples choices as the quintessence of de-
velopment.
I will, however, have to except the most
recent Report from this praise, in that it,
with its projection of an intact world with-
out poverty, went far beyond the goal of
opposing to disaster scenarios an optimistic
vision. It offered not only old wine in new
skins but an illusion that fails to impart to
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international development policy a realistic
action perspective - and is therefore
counterproductive. Why did UNDP
squander its chance to win profile as an
international pressure group for the DAC
goal? Anyone who wants to achieve
political effects must see to it that he does
not completely leave the ground of reali-
ties. Illusions do not solve world problems.
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The position of development
policy: a functional definition2
1. The shift in the significance of
externally-oriented
policy fields
The end of the East-West conflict, the
advent of globalization, the challenges of
the future that demand global solutions and
the new position Germany is assuming in
the world have led both to changes in the
self-perception and a shift in the
importance of externally-oriented policy
fields (paradigm shift). Foreign policy,
defense policy, and development policy are
caught up to equal extents in a phase of
redefining paradigms, fields of activity,
and instruments. At the same time, the
specialized ministries are expanding their
international activities.
In the field of foreign policy,
paradigms such as Western orientation,
German unity, and détente have been
supplanted by new factors such as a united
Germany's role in the world, overall
European integration, crisis management in
Europe and other parts of the world, and
measures for flanking locational policy, in
conjunction, for example, with strategies
keyed to Asia and Latin America. New
treaty-based systems of international
relations are emerging. Europe is seeking a
                                         
2 NB: This paper represents the author's
personal opinions. It contains thoughts which the
author presented at the beginning of 1998 at the
Stiftung für Entwicklung und Frieden [Foundation
for Development and Peace], University of
Duisburg.
focused dialogue with other regions of the
world. In operational terms, the German
Foreign Ministry has, in the framework of
its equipment aid, developed new
instruments such as democratization
assistance and mine clearance.
Humanitarian aid has more and more
clearly become an instrument situated
somewhere between political crisis
management and reconstruction.
As far as defense policy is concerned,
the Bundeswehr as grown out of its purely
defense-related duties and now also
e gages in humanitarian missions and
peacekeeping measures abroad, providing
logistic support for military missions
conducted by allied countries. There are
also discussions underway on possible
further-reaching fields of deployment,
including the use of military force to
secure ecological resources. Military
cooperation with countries outside of
NATO is being expanded.
In the field of development policy,
Germany's perception of itself as an
advocate of the economic and social
development of the so-called developing
countries, a perception which evolved in
the shadow of the East-West conflict, is
being overtaken by paradigms such as
globally sutainable development or
poverty alleviation. Development policy
has at the same time also been assigned
new tasks, inter alia in Central and Eastern
Europe, in the fields of global
environmental protection and promotion of
human rights and democracy, but also as
regards locational policy. Development
policy, with its new emergency aid
instruments, is becoming more heavily
committed in the area of crisis
management and is looking for ways to
combine public sector and private sector
involvement in the task of shaping
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conditions abroad. German development
policy has elaborated regionally
differentiated strategies in keeping with the
growing differentiation to be observed in
its partner countries. In the interests of
coherence, corrections are being called for
in other policy fields as well as in global
framework conditions.
The globalization of specialized policy
tasks has resulted in the breaking down of
foreign relations into different policy areas
which are more and more being recognized
as specialized policies. What we see here
is the repetition of a process that has
already taken place in domestic policy,
whereby specialized tasks were gradually
removed from ministries of the interior. In
their external relations, the specialized
ministries are building on their
responsibilities and competence for
specialized international organizations and
treaties, while domestically they focus on
their links to specialized bodies, to the
legislature, as well as to lobby groups;
these links enable them to implement
internationally coordinated policies at
home. The increasingly international
nature of their functions finds expression
in particular in the “world conferences”, as
they are known, as well as in the
development of global systems of
standards and regulations.
The overall outcome of the shifts in
paradigms, spheres of activity, and
instruments shows that traditional
categorizations no longer apply. Different
instruments are used to pursue the same
goals in different fields of activity.
Instruments tailored to individual fields of
activity are used to reach different goals.
The connections and overlaps between
various policy fields are increasing. The
opportunities offered by synergy and
coherence are countered by the risks
s emming from the work of one body being
either duplicated or obstructed by another.
2. Some questions concerning
the position of development
policy
It is against this background that
development policy and the German
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ) will, like other
externally-oriented policy fields, have to
redefine their place within the overall
system of externally-oriented
governmental activity. Any rational
categorization of development policy and
the BMZ in the overall system of
externally-oriented policy fields requires
answers to questions from the following
three areas:
· The first issue is their relationship to
“foreign policy” in the narrower sense,
which shares development policy's
interdisciplinary and external
orientation, while at the same time
differing from it fundamentally in
terms of its fields of activity and
instruments.
· Secondly, it is necessary to define their
relationship to specialized policy areas
that, on the one hand, have certain
expectations as regards development
policy and its instruments and, on the
other hand, see themselves and their
instruments confronted by expectations
relating to development policy.
· The third concern is the g ographical
mandate of development policy,
which is, on the one hand, faced by
new challenges in Central and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union
and, on the other hand, has been
challenged in its very existence with
regard to what are known as the newly
industrialized countries (NICs).
38 ADOLF KLOKE-LESCH
In the past, development policy as a
rule defined its own role and its position
vis-à-vis other policy fields primarily in
normative terms, i.e. based on the goals it
pursued. In this respect, it differed from the
usual functional role perception that
applied in other policy fields. Thus foreign
policy or economic policy was not defined
in normative terms as peace policy or full-
employment policy but primarily
conceived in functional terms, in other
words as the government-level formulation
of relations with other states or as the
influence exercised by the state on the
economic order, process, or structures. The
normative stipulations are made politically
and have, in these cases, also found their
specific fundamental expression in laws
(e.g. Foreign Service Act, Act on Stability
and Growth), which do not, however,
prescribe fixed political targets.
It is important to investigate, against the
background of the broad political
discussion on the invigoration and the
future role of development policy, whether
a normatively expressed definition of its
role will in the future enable development
policy to adopt its proper place within the
structure of other policy fields, which are
defined primarily in functional terms.
According to the traditional normative
definition, development policy was the
process of promoting the economic and
social development of the so-called
developing countries. Such a limited
concept of development policy neglects the
enormous expansion in geographical,
technical, and normative scope and
interlinkage of the tasks to be dealt with,
thus making development a niche policy
field which nevertheless makes
maximum demands in terms of
responsibilities and unilaterally demands
coherence from the other policy fields. The
same would apply all the more for any
additional normative restriction of the self-
perception of development policy to
poverty alleviation.
But more recent normative conceptions
of development policy as the policy of
global sustainable development are
equally ill-suited to defining development
policy’s position in the overall scheme.
Such concepts of development policy as
world development policy not only make
u realistic and exaggerated claims for
d velopment policy, they would at the
same time also lead to other specialized
policy fields losing their international
dimensions, thus provincializing them.
Moreover, a policy of global sustainability
must also focus on (adverse) developments
at home. It should also be noted that there
are other policy-related tasks abroad that
are not so easy to place in the context of
global sustainable development (crisis
prevention, emergency aid, human rights,
etc.) or for which this goal can have only
the character of a normative collateral
condition (migration, safeguarding
economic and security interests).
All purely normative approaches tend to
look down on other policy fields, and their
relationship to other goals and interests is
an unclear one. Due to their normative
constriction and the maximum claims to
competence by which they are
characterized, they are incapable of
effecting any viable integration of
d velopment policy and the BMZ into the
overall system of external policy fields. In
the past, such approaches have led to
problems of communication and
coordination and tended to hinder
development policy from positioning itself
in its appropriate place.
Closely associated with the traditional
normative self-conception of development
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policy is a teleological (goals-focused)
understanding of the concept of
development itself is, whereby
development is understood as further
development, as a forward-moving
process, one leading to a better state of
affairs, the direction of which is already
pre-defined by the term itself. A
preordained definition of this sort is no
longer possible, if only because of the
current wide variety of different qualitative
conceptions of development. The notion
that the direction of development can be
inferred from the fostering of the inherent
aptitudes of the development subject also
has its limitations. Firstly, there is the
difficulty of precisely identifying what
these aptitudes are and, secondly, there is
the interdependent relationship between
development and values and interests.
Today, development must be understood
conceptually as an open-ended process, a
process whose direction can be influenced
by goals and interests that must be
formulated, both nationally and
internationally, by means of the ongoing
political discourse.
It no longer seems possible to
categorize development policy in a rational
way by defining its motives, goals, and
interests; what is needed is careful
consideration of the function of
development policy within the overall
system of externally-oriented policy fields.
The core question is not, "What is the
purpose of development policy?" but
"What is development policy?" The goals
and interests that development policy
should pursue must neverthel ss be defined
through the political process and do not
result from a functional definition of
development policy’s tasks. Only in this
way is it possible to find aswers that are
also comprehensible to other policy fields
and that can be used by development
policy and the BMZ to make an optimal
contribution to the overall system of
xternal policies.
If development policy and the BMZ
themselves leave behind their primarily
normative self-conception a d start out
by defining their future role in
functional terms, i.e. in terms of their
fields of activity and their instruments,
they could become open for the broad
range of Germany's goals and interests
abroad and place their claims for
functional competence and substantive
responsibility on a new foundation.
3. Spheres of activity,
instruments, and goals of
external governmental activity
The overall system of a country's external
activity includes widely differing areas
such as trade, investment, technology,
migration, the environment, health, culture,
and political and military power. The
majority of the actors operating in most of
these fields are private persons, firms, and
institutions. Governmental activity in
these fields is, in principle, concerned only
with two fields of activity:
· contributing to the shaping of mutual
relations between the countries
concerned and
· contributing to the shaping of
conditions in other countries.
Governmental activity in principle has
both internally and externally oriented
instruments which either serve to
regulate nongovernmental activity or
themselves constitu e governmental
activity:
Externally:
· diplomacy, including bilateral and
multilateral treaties,
· cooperation,
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· threat and use of military force.
Internally:
· establishment of legal norms, including
enforcement,
· financial and other promotion activities
· awareness-raising.
The goals of external policy are highly
diverse and varied. They may be either
immediate or intermediate goals, be
located at home or abroad, and, like all
political goals, be subject to change over
time. The significance of fields of activity
and the categorization and orientation of
instruments change accordingly.
It is thus necessary to distinguish
between the functional conception of
external policy fields ( i.e. defined in terms
of fields and instruments) and the goals
pursued by them, which must be
formulated politically. It is possible to
pursue the same goal in different fields of
activity, using different instruments.
Equally, a field of activity or an instrument
may be used to achieve different goals
(fungibility).
4. Functional categorization of
development policy
4.1 Fields of activity
As regards the fields of activity of
externally-oriented policies, development
policy and foreign policy differ to the
extent that
· foreign policy in the narrow sense is
tailored above all to shaping relations
with other countries and
· development policy is above all
tailored to shaping conditions in other
countries.
Foreign policy's concentration on the
aspect of relations is just as classic a
characteristic of it as is the fact that
development policy is geared to changing
the conditions in other countries, and thus
diverges, to some extent, from the
principle of non-intervention.
The major difference between the
various specialized policies, on the one
hand, and foreign policy and development
policy on the other is that
· the fields of activity of foreign policy
and development policy are
interdisciplinary and externally
oriented and
· the fields of activity of specialized
policies and ministries are specific and
geared above all to shaping conditions
at home.
It is only in a secondary – and derived –
sense that the specialized policy fields are
concerned with helping shape relations
with other countries in the specialist field
c ncerned.
Where specialized policy fields operate
abroad, their activities should therefore be
seen as serving to influence foreign
relations.
Environmental policy has a special
place in the field of specialized policies.
As a specialized policy, it is geared first of
all to conditions at home and the
corresponding relations to other countries.
However, it differs fundamentally from
foreign policy, development policy, and
other specialized policies in that
· as global environmental policy, its
field of activity also includes the
conditions in the global environment
common to all countries ("global
commons") and, by inference,
influencing the "relations" of all
countries to this environment, which
can itself not act in the capacity of a
subject of international law.
Since the conditions in other countries
are essential to their relations to the global
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environment, and thus for the conditions
pertaining to it, the relationship between
development policy and environmental
policy is one marked by an especially
intensive reciprocity.
4.2 Instruments
As regards their instruments, foreign
policy and development policy differ
above all in that, in their own individual
spheres of official activity,
· foreign policy is pursued in particular
with the instruments of diplomacy and
· development policy is carried out in
particular using the instruments of
cooperation in carrying out projects
and programs and in influencing
framework conditions in partner
countries (political dialogue).
Foreign policy and development policy
have therefore created entirely different
organizations and institutions for realizing
their objectives: in foreign policy these are
primarily the diplomatic service and in
development policy primarily the
implementing agencies required to realize
its projects.
As far as the regulation of externally
oriented, nongovernmental activity and
of domestic activity with an external
impact is concerned,
· foreign policy uses in particular
instruments aimed at administering and
at establishing safeguards,
· development policy uses in particular
instruments geared to promotion and
awareness-building.
Foreign policy serves here chiefly to
make nongovernmental relations possible
and to influence them with a view to
achieving a desired state of relations.
Development policy, on the other hand, is
keyed to influencing ongovernmental
relations with a view to achieving a desired
impact in the partner country.
As far as the specialized policy fields
are concerned, it is evident that their
externally oriented instruments consist
above all of a reciprocal technical
exchange with other countries and the
development of systems of bilateral and
multilateral technical standards and
regulations.
While transboundary projects, for
example, are realized in what is foreign
territory for each of the countries involved,
the process is nevertheless directly
concerned with shaping conditions at
home. Development policy, on the other
hand, promotes projects abroad that are
initially concerned with changing
conditions in the partner country itself and
that without this support would not be
realized at all – or at least not in the form
envisaged by the promoting side.
Defense policy has a special position as
regards its instruments. Its central
instrument, the threat and use of military
force, distinguishes it fundamentally from
the civilian instruments of foreign policy,
development policy, and specialized
policies. Above and beyond the immediate
field of providing for external security,
defense policy can also be used to
influence relations to and conditions in
other countries, i.e. it can at the same time
be employed to flank and complement
civilian instruments.
4.3 Geographical mandates
The geographical mandates of the various
xternally-oriented policy fields do not
f llow immediately from their specific
functions; they instead result from -
politically formulated - goals and interests,
the fields of activity affected by them, and
the suitability of the individual instruments
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involved. They are thus, fundamentally and
in the intensity with which they are
fulfilled, subject to a process of temporal
change. The experience of the past years
has made this particularly clear.
The geographical mandates of the
various policy fields result in particular
from the following presuppositions:
· Foreign policy today has a
geographically unrestricted mandate,
not least because nearly all countries
are members of the United Nations.
The intensity with which this mandate
is fulfilled is nevertheless dependent on
the significance that the respective
relations have for the country
concerned.
· The geographical mandate of
development policy follows from the
specific – politically formulated –
necessity of contributing to the
shaping of conditions in other
countries and today includes
practically all countries outside the EU,
North America, Japan, and Australia
and New Zealand.
· The geographical mandates of the
specialized policy fields are derived
from the significance of external
relations in that particular field for
tackling national and global tasks.
· The geographical mandate of d fense
policy, in terms of the threat and use of
military force, is derived from the
specific political task it is to fulfil, and
usually comes into play in cases where
the use of other instruments is regarded
as either inadequate or inadequate on
its own.
Against the background of global
changes and challenges, we must today
proceed on the assumption that externally-
oriented policy fields have a fundamentally
unrestricted mandate in geographical
terms. This is most significant in defense
policy and development policy, which are
bandoning their former self-imposed
restrictions and assuming a global
presence.
4.4 Functional definition of
development policy
Based on a delimitation of fields of activity
and instruments vis-à-vis foreign policy
and specialized policy fields, a
functionally-oriented view of development
policy and the BMZ would best be defined
as follows:
Development policy helps shape
conditions in other countries (it field of
activity) with civilian means (its
instruments). These instruments include
above all the realization of projects and
programs coupled with an active influence
on the framework conditions in partner
countries as well as influence on external
nongovernmental activity by means of
promotion and awareness-building.
On the basis of national goals and
interests, development policy defines the
desired conditions in partner countries,
regulates the use of its instruments, and
is accordingly actively involved in
shaping other fields of activity and in the
use of their instruments.
Development policy is thus an
autonomous policy field that differs
fundamentally from other external policy
areas in terms of its field of activity and its
instruments, whilst at the same time being
committed to the totality of goals and
interests.
Development policy becomes active in
cases where it is politically desired and
politically possible (whenever, wherever
and for whatever reason) to influence
conditions in other countries using civilian
means. The scope available to
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development policy also depends, of
course, on its being at least tolerated by the
partner. The type and extent of partnership
must, however, again be assigned to the
normative sphere. Here, it is a matter in
particular of the significance of the
partner's values and standards, goals and
interests.
Combined impact of development
policy and other policy fields
Growing globalization and
interdependence both between regions and
between specialized fields have led to a
situation in which rigid categorizations of
paradigms, fields of activity, and
instruments are no longer possible. It must
instead be assumed that all policy fields
generally pursue, or at least take into
consideration, the totality of goals and
interests (precept of mutual coherence).
It is thus not possible to delineate policy
fields chiefly by categorizing fields of
goals and interests, i.e. at the normative
level; this must instead be done
functionally in terms of fields of activity
and instruments.
The need for functional cooperation
between policy fields is apparent in a
growing number of cases. In Bos ia it is
foreign policy that is shaping relations
between the parties involved and
establishing the general international legal
framework; development policy is using
projects and programs in a great variety of
sectors to foster a change in existing
conditions; defense policy is being used to
ensure the implementation of agreements
by means of the threat and use of military
force; and domestic policy (here in the
concrete shape of refugee policy) is
seeking to influence migration patterns
using measures designed to encourage
repatriation. In the field of global
environmental protection, e vironmental
policy is framing international conventions
int nded to regulate ecological relations
both on a reciprocal basis and vis-à-vis the
global environment; development policy is
influencing ecologically relevant behavior
in other countries, for instance by means of
projects and programs designed to
implement the respective conventions. As
far as poverty alleviation is concerned,
development policy is used to influence the
framework conditions in the partner
countries, promoting projects and
programs there; foreign trade policy is
establishing trade preferences and market
access for the countries concerned. As far
a  German locational policy is concerned,
foreign trade policy is used to strengthen
economic ties to other countries by means
of appropriate conventions and guarantees;
foreign policy serves to shape favorable
political relations; development policy uses
its instruments to work towards achieving
favorable conditions in partner countries.
As an interdisciplinary policy field,
development policy can combine different
goals and interests at the regional level and
pursue them in an integrated manner. In
cooperation with other countries it is to this
extent an especially efficient functional
area, one that links country-related,
instrumental, and technical competence.
5. Functional competences and
ultimate substantive
responsibility
The fact that the clusters of goals and
interests are growing in complexity,
straddling individual policy fields, i.e.
cannot be pursued by one policy field
alone, means that questions of
coordination and coherence must be
addressed. Mention should be made first of
all of the German federal government as a
collegial organ and the chancellor's power
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to determine policy guidelines, the aim of
which is to ensure an integrated political
line. However, it is necessary to assign to
the ministries certain competencies and
areas in which they are to wield ultimate
overall  responsibility so that the relevant
decisions can be prepared. As far as the
functional tasks of policy fields are
concerned, i.e. the areas for which they are
competent, this was done above.
Substantive goals and interests must then
be assigned pragmatically, building on this
foundation. The decisive criterion is thus
the question which functional area can
provide the essential contribution needed
to deal effectively with a concrete task.
Assigning a concrete task to a policy field
means that the latter has ultimate
responsibility for this task and will
coordinate the corresponding activities of
other policy fields. But this does not mean
that that these policy fields should be
allowed to become the sole or dominant
substantive task of the policy field in
question. No policy field can claim for
itself a priority for coherence or a special
role as the sole cross-cutting field, since
the majority of concrete priority-level tasks
must be regarded as cross-cutting tasks
(e.g. locational policy, environmental
policy, security policy, crisis prevention,
promotion of developing countries, poverty
alleviation).
Against this background, the policy
field of development policy should take
on the following functional competences
and areas of substantive ultimate
responsibility:
· Functional: competence for all civilian
measures (in particular projects and
programs and political dialogue) that
play a part in shaping conditions in
other countries as well as for the
corresponding national and
international events and institutions.
· Substantive: Ultimate responsibility
for all substantive tasks that can
primarily be tackled using means that
stem from its area of functional
competence, i.e.
· geographically: all tasks related to
countries and regions that call above all
for a contribution to shaping the
conditions there; selection and
specification of such countries;
formulation of the goals and interests
to be pursued in these countries;
· specialized: all specialized tasks in the
partner countries and all specialized
global tasks that chiefly call for
contributions to shaping conditions in
other countries, including the relevant
international events and institutions.
As far as functional competences are
concerned, the essential development-
related instruments have already been
concentrated within the BMZ. To them
should be added in particular a number of
competencies still scattered over various
other ministries: European development
policy, humanitarian aid, including
UNHCR, UNWRA, and UNICEF, civilian
equipment aid and democratization aid,
and the European Bank for Recovery and
Development (EBRD). But measures
initiated for the benefit of German
settlement areas abroad, in which it is in
any case not possible to distinguish
between Germans and partner country
nationals, also fall within the functional
scope of development policy. Instruments
that do not fall within the scope of
development policy are those used chiefly
to shape relations with other countries, e.g.
foreign cultural policy, including
UNESCO, world trade policy with the
WTO, or monetary policy with the IMF.
THE POSITION OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY 45
However, development policy must
collaborate in these fields within the terms
of its remit, e.g. when the IMF, by
imposing conditions, influences
circumstances in the relevant partner
countries.
As far as ultimate responsibility for
specific sectors is concerned, development
policy has, in geographical terms, so far
been assigned those countries known as
developing countries. To this should be
added responsibility for the NICs, to the
extent that there is a need to help shape
conditions there. The same should apply
unreservedly for Eastern and Central
Europe. Whilst further geographical tasks
are not currently on the horizon, the
possibility should not be rule out entirely.
As far as pecialized tasks in partner
countries are concerned, it is virtually self-
evident that development policy should
bear ultimate responsibility for the so-
called developing countries. As regards
NICs and the countries in Eastern and
Central Europe, development policy must
make it plain that it is ready and willing to
integrate goals and interests stemming
from other policy fields into its own field
of activities.
As far as pecialized global tasks are
concerned, development policy has so far
not been assigned any comprehensive
ultimate responsibility for any one field.
Some of these tasks primarily require the
formulation of regulations aimed at
influencing the international behavior of
states and thus, because the aim is to
influence relations, they fall within the
scope of responsibility of the specialized
policy field, e.g. in the fields of global
climate protec ion or maritime law.
Development policy plays a part in
establishing these regulations and uses its
instruments to actively participate in
implementing the relevant concepts (e.g.
GEF, Montreal Protocol fund, CFC fund
for Russia). In the future, development
policy should be assigned ultimate
r sponsibility for those fields that chiefly
call for contributions to shaping the
conditions in partner countries. This is
already the case in the fields of
desertification and poverty reduction. It
might, for instance, also be possible to add
the fields of world population, world food
security, and water resources. The relevant
world conferences should be placed under
the responsibility of development policy,
even though they may, in some subordinate
areas, concern other policy fields.
Conversely, development policy cannot
assume specialized responsibility in places
where it itself is concerned functionally
only as one subordinate field among
others, e.g. health, women.
The paradigm of globally sustainable
evelopment is conceived as an
interdisciplinary and transboundary
guideline for all policy fields. It requires
measures both at home and abroad and in
ternational relations. Due to its
interdisciplinary character, its functional
mandate abroad, and its practical
orientation, development policy has a
particular affinity to this paradigm. Its
functional mandate at home is, however,
essentially restricted to raising awareness,
with the aim of using altered behavioral
patterns to achieve effects in other
countries. It also lacks the functional
competence in cases where the behavior of
other countries is influenced only via
international rule systems, i.e. by the
instruments of the specialized policy fields
(e.g. the USA in the field of climate
protection). Since the paradigm of globally
sustainable development is tailored both to
the conditions in other countries and at
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home and to the conditions in the
environment shared by all countries,
development policy can assume ultimate
substantive responsibility only in close
cooperation with environmental policy.
6. Concentration on core
development tasks
As far as the necessary concentration on
core development tasks is concerned, the
traditional normative approach must give
way to a reformulated, primarily functional
definition of development policy. The
question can thus no longer be what
contribution a task, an instrument, or a
working unit can make, for example, in
promoting the developing countries; rather
it must first be asked whether the task falls
within the functional domain of
development policy, and then what
contribution it makes to tackling the
substantive tasks for which development
policy bears ultimate responsibility.
Development policy should thus generally
concentrate on the tasks for which it can
claim functional competence and
ultimate substantive responsibility. It
should collaborate in other policy fields
only when this is necessitated due to it
having ultimate substantive responsibility
for the geographical or technical area
concerned or where development policy
can make valuable contributions to other
spheres of responsibility (e.g. global
environmental protection).
As far as functional competence is
concerned, development policy's core task
is to make available all civilian instruments
needed by the German government to
pursue it goals and interests in helping to
shape conditions in other countries. Whilst
there is scope for internal concentration
and streamlining here, the handing over of
individual instruments to other policy
fields is out of the question. The same
applies for national and international
d velopment institutions.
As far as ultimate substantive
responsibilities are concerned, the same
applies for all tasks concerned with
countries and regions (e.g. promotion of
LDCs, tackling social and ecological
problems in NICs, supporting the
transformation process in Eastern Europe).
Any concentration on priority countries,
country groups, or regions and the goals
and interests pursued there can, inevitably,
only be one pursued by the German
government as a whole. As soon as the
German government perceives – for
whatever reason – the need to contribute to
shaping conditions in individual countries,
these tasks must also be taken on by
development policy. While developm nt
policy is responsible for selecting and
defining its partner countries and
formulating the goals to be pursued there,
it must at the same time also take into
account the totality of goals and interests.
If development policy were to restrict itself
to individual goals and interests, it would
be abandoning one of its central strengths –
the drawing together of different concerns
at the regional level – and become another
specialized policy area. Consideration
could be given to concentration on, for
example, countries and regions which,
owing to their geographical location,
economic or political significance, or
relevance for solving global tasks in a
particular field (e.g. poverty alleviation,
environmental protection, population
policy), are of particular importance to
Germany in the pursuit of its goals and
interests.
As far as ultimate substantive
responsibility for specialized tasks in
partner countries is concerned,
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concentration would also be possible as a
function of concentration on countries,
goals, and interests, but it is not possible to
hand these tasks over to other policy fields.
As far as global specialized tasks are
concerned, efforts should be made to effect
a concentration on what are, from the
German perspective, the central issues of
the future which at the same time call, to a
significant extent, for a contribution to be
made to shaping conditions in other
countries. Development policy should only
become involved in dealing with global
specialized tasks that primarily concern
global framework conditions and/or can
only be solved by establishing international
standards and regulations to the extent that
this is fundamentally important to
development policy's geographical and
specialized responsibilities and if a
reasonable degree of success may be
expected.
Any reflections regarding concentration
on functional and substantive core tasks in
the field of development policy must be
distinguished from the BMZ's necessary
concentration on core ministerial tasks.
Yet it goes without saying that the BMZ
must, above all, deal competently with its
sphere of functional competence and the
fields in which it bears ultimate substantive
responsibility. The BMZ should therefore,
in functional terms, be in a position to at
least
· integrate the various goals and interests
pursued by Germany in its efforts to
shape conditions in other countries by
establishing coherent and goal-oriented
strategies that are either country-
oriented or, in sectors where the BMZ
has ultimate responsibility, of a
specialized technical nature
· effectively implement these strategies
by using its instruments, in particular
by promoting projects and programs
coupled with the task of influencing the
framework conditions in its partner
countries.
Tackling this core functional task of
development policy also involves
managing of the relevant national and
international institutions. However,
functional and sub tantive tasks may be
handed over to these institutions only to
the extent that this would not impair
ministerial competences and
responsibilities.
7. Final remark
This attempt to define the position of
development policy in functional terms is
intended as an aid to structuring the
ongoing debate in this time of shifting
d velopment paradigms. It is not a plea for
development policy to abandon its goals.
Values and standards provide the essential
foundation and framework for a
d mocratic state ruled by law to pursue its
goals and interests. Development policy
should see its functional task as the
formulation, focusing, and implementation
of the whole range of these goals and
interests with an eye to its specific field of
activity – the conditions in other countries.
